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DEBIASING ADVERTISING: BALANCING 
RISK, HOPE, AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
David Adam Friedman* 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the nuances of “debiasing through law,” 
a regulatory approach proposed by Christine Jolls and Cass 
Sunstein. Proponents have described advertising regulation as a 
form of debiasing through law. Debiasing approaches regulation 
through less paternalistic means using strategies that improve 
consumer decision making. Proponents believe that the improved 
decision making will gracefully lead to better choices. These 
debiasing strategies find some of their roots in addressing human 
cognitive biases and bounded rationality. 
Although debiasing through law purports to offer an attractive 
alternative to pure paternalism, this Article demonstrates that the 
net social welfare effects of this approach can prove difficult to 
anticipate. An examination of the recent tightening of the 
regulation of consumer endorsements in advertising illuminates 
the challenges and nuances of the debiasing approach.   
This Article attempts to answer a myriad of questions. Does 
removing the consumer endorsement tool from the marketing 
arsenal ensure that consumers will make better decisions? The 
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truthful consumer endorsement can offer other consumers 
legitimate hope. When netted out, does taking “hope” off the 
market advance social welfare? Can regulators remove true 
information from the marketplace and expect to foster an 
improvement in social welfare? Can regulators preserve real 
choice while simultaneously improving decisions? Are regulators 
truly capable of harnessing cognitive and social science to engage 
in this sort of precision welfare engineering? Consumer-
endorsement regulation presents a live proxy for the analytical 
dissection of debiasing through law. 
Some scholars have expressed a keen skepticism toward this 
approach to regulation and toward the whole of behavioral law 
and economics. This Article presents a cautionary tale about the 
unpredictability of the net outcomes from deploying debiasing 
through law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Jared Fogle not only stumbled across a fantastic way to lose 
weight, but he also had impeccable timing. The advocate for using 
Subway sandwiches as a delicious vehicle for weight loss managed 
to get discovered and signed to a promotional deal in 1997—over a 
decade before the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) tightened its 
guidance on “consumer endorsements.”1 Jared offered a powerful 
narrative to consumers about his experience consuming Subway 
products.2 Even though Jared Fogle’s experience may have been 
freakish, consumers received the message that at the outer 
boundary, consumption of Subway products could produce 
extraordinary weight-loss results.  
The FTC’s 2009 revisions to the regulation of consumer 
endorsements, however, would have smothered in the cradle the 
welfare-yielding transactions that ultimately resulted from the 
Jared campaign. Reacting to the strong, psychologically persuasive 
pull of true information transmitted from a peer,3 the FTC literally 
                                                          
1 See Nightline: Jared’s Revenge, Eat Fresh Empire (ABC television 
broadcast Aug. 14, 2009) (transcript available at 2009 WLNR 15859461) 
[hereinafter Jared’s Revenge]. See also Guides Concerning the Use of 
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.2 (2009); FTC 
Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest. 
shtm. 
2 See Advertising and Consumer Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & 
Transp., 111th Cong. (2009), available at 2009 WLNR 13979468 (statement of 
Sally Greenberg, Exec. Dir., National Consumers League) [hereinafter 
Greenberg Statement]; Jared’s Revenge, supra note 1. 
3 See FTC Requests Public Comments on Endorsement Guides, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/fyi 
0707.shtm (seeking comment about two empirical studies performed by 
marketing professors about the implicitly cognitive impact of endorsements on 
consumers). See also MANOJ HASTAK & MICHAEL B. MAZIS, THE EFFECT OF 
CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS AND DISCLOSURES ON AD COMMUNICATION FOR A 
DIETARY SUPPLEMENT (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/endorsements/study1/report.pdf [hereinafter HASTAK & MAZIS, DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS]; MANOJ HASTAK & MICHAEL B. MAZIS, EFFECTS OF CONSUMER 
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warns advertisers choosing to use consumer endorsements to 
prepare for litigation. Specifically, the FTC counsels advertisers to 
generate and retain empirical data proving that their consumer-
endorsement advertisements are non-deceptive. The FTC 
recommends this practice in order to avoid the initiation of an FTC 
action.4 Had Jared Fogle achieved his Subway weight-loss feat 
today, Subway would have had substantially more risks to weigh 
in employing his endorsement. Had the threat of FTC action 
prevented this advertising campaign, Jared and Subway would 
have suffered welfare losses, but so would consumers who might 
have benefited from the message.5  
The revision of the FTC consumer-endorsement guide 
illustrates some of the complexities of evaluating this particular 
application of behavioral law and economics in regulation, or as 
Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have deemed it, “debiasing 
through law.”6 Debiasing through law purports to bring attractive 
features to the regulatory arena, achieving welfare-enhancing 
outcomes without paternalism.  The debiasing approach involves 
influencing human decision making up-front and at the source, and 
enabling people to make better choices and presumably to enjoy 
better outcomes.7 Debiasing proponents wish to avoid the 
                                                          
TESTIMONIALS IN WEIGHT LOSS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENT AND BUSINESS 
OPPORTUNITY ADVERTISEMENTS (Sep. 22, 2004), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/reports/endorsements/study2/report.pdf [hereinafter HASTAK & MAZIS, 
WEIGHT LOSS]. 
4 See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.2 (2009). 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein coined this phrase. See generally 
Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUDIES 
199 (2006). 
7 This Article will use the “debiasing through law” term formalized by Jolls 
and Sunstein, as the descriptive term and the associated scholarship provide an 
elegant and straightforward framework for evaluating the recent regulatory 
approach taken by the FTC with respect to consumer endorsements. In kind, 
consumer-endorsement regulation can help inform a broader understanding of 
debiasing through law. Note that the developing scholarship around this area 
continues to grow, right along with the broader behavioral economics literature, 
albeit with different labels. Sunstein and Thaler have also described this 
regulatory approach as “libertarian paternalism,” selling the notion that 
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“paternalistic” approach of removing actual choice from the 
marketplace, while changing the environment to promote improved 
decision making.8 
A regulatory approach this delicate and dramatic, hinging on 
inexact or controversial behavioral science, invites scrutiny.9 Some 
                                                          
benevolent interventions can guide people toward making better autonomous 
decisions that will presumably lead to better outcomes. They have described 
libertarian paternalism as a “relatively weak, soft, and non-intrusive type of 
paternalism because choices are not blocked off, fenced off, or significantly 
burdened.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (2008) [hereinafter 
SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE]. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 
(2003) [hereinafter Thaler & Sunstein, Not an Oxymoron]; Richard H. Thaler & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003) 
[hereinafter Thaler & Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism]. Others have laid out 
the similar concept of “asymmetric” paternalism, dangling it with an ideological 
spin.  
A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits 
for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those 
who are fully rational . . . . Such regulations are relatively harmless to 
those who reliably make decisions in their best interest, while at the 
same time advantageous to those making suboptimal choices.  
Colin Camerer, Samuel Issachoroff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & 
Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003). 
Finally, and perhaps most notoriously, Sunstein and Thaler packaged the 
concept for a broader audience as “nudging.”  
A nudge . . . is any aspect of the choice architecture [manipulation of 
surroundings] that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. [In the context of improving 
food choices in a cafeteria,] [p]utting the fruit at eye level counts as a 
nudge. Banning junk food does not. [A ban would be a mandate].  
SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, supra. 
8 See generally Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6. 
9 Indeed, Jolls and Sunstein anticipate and acknowledge some of this 
criticism. See id. at 226 (acknowledging some of the work of Jeffrey Rachlinski 
and Robert Rasmussen). See Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological 
Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1206–19 (2003); Robert K 
Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law, 
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scholars have expressed a keen skepticism toward this approach to 
regulation and toward the whole of behavioral law and 
economics.10 This Article presents a cautionary tale about the 
                                                          
and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1697–98 (1998). 
10 The debate about the nature and existence of the endowment effect 
provides but one scholarly battleground in the behavioral law and economics 
debate. For two robust studies that challenged the well-established status quo, 
sparking a debate, see generally Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The 
Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the Endowment Effect, Subject 
Misconceptions and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 530 (2004) [hereinafter Plott & Zeiler, The Willingness Gap] 
(employing new experimental tactics, which undermined key assumptions 
behind the endowment effect) and Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange 
Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory 
and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007) [hereinafter Plott & 
Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries] (conjecturing that asymmetries in exchange can 
be explained through preference theory). Stephen M. Bainbridge urged 
regulatory caution in the wake of Plott and Zeiler’s 2004 findings, which posited 
that the endowment effect fails to explain the gap between willingness to pay 
and willingness to accept: “The regulator ought to be confident that (a) the 
endowment effect is really present; (b) as a result of the endowment effect, an 
inefficient outcome is proving sticky; (c) that market experience cannot remove 
the anomaly; and (d) there is a superior regulatory solution.” Joshua Wright, The 
Endowment Effect’s Disappearing Act, IDEOBLOG (Dec. 24, 2005, 01:53 AM), 
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2005/12/the_endowment_e.html (quoting 
Stephen M. Bainbridge) (Bainbridge’s original post to which Wright links is 
unavailable). For a representative and compelling exchange invoking this 
counter to the established perspective on the endowment effect see John Carney, 
How the Trendiest Economists Got Their Prized Discovery Terribly Wrong, 
BUSINESS INSIDER CLUSTERSTOCK (Oct. 5, 2009, 08:58 AM), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/john-carney-how-the-trendiest-economists-got-their-prized-
discovery-terribly-wrong-2009-10; Larry E. Ribstein, The Regulatory Risks of 
Behavioral Finance, IDEOBLOG (Oct. 5, 2009, 09:14 AM), http://bus 
movie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/10/the-regulatory-risks-of-behavioral-
finance.html; Josh Wright, What’s Wrong with the Endowment Effect?, TRUTH 
ON THE MARKET (Oct. 6, 2009, 01:22 PM), http://www.truthonthemarket.com/ 
2009/10/06/whats-wrong-with-the-endowment-effect; Gordon Smith, What’s 
Wrong with the “Endowment Effect”?, THE CONGLOMERATE (Oct. 6, 2009), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/10/whats-wrong-with-the-endowment-
effect.html; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure and Securities 
Regulation: A Behavioral Analysis, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 29, 2010, 
11:00 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/ 
01/mandatory-disclosure-and-securities-regulation-a-behavioral-analysis.html.  
FRIEDMAN - FINAL2.DOC 5/17/2011  12:45 PM 
546 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
unpredictability of the net outcomes from debiasing, using as a 
vehicle the anticipated effectiveness and potential unintended 
consequences resulting from the new FTC guide. 
Additionally, Jolls and Sunstein posit with specificity that 
advertising regulation presents an actual pre-existing example of 
debiasing through law.11 Advertising regulation usually focuses on 
purifying or supplementing the flow of information that advertisers 
use to influence consumer decision making.12 Though Jolls and 
Sunstein argue that debiasing through law appears less intrusive 
and paternalistic,13 this Article argues that upon closer examination 
through the lens of a specific form of advertising regulation, the 
net effects of debiasing can prove difficult to anticipate. Examining 
the new consumer-endorsement approach in detail can help 
illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims embodied by 
Jolls and Sunstein. Are regulators truly capable of this sort of 
precision welfare engineering? Can regulators preserve real choice 
while simultaneously improving decisions? Consumer-
endorsement regulation presents a live example of debiasing in 
action.  
Although the new approach to consumer endorsements may 
alter decision making and protect some consumers from entering 
into social-welfare-destroying transactions, this Article notes that 
this approach may cause consumers to forgo welfare-creating 
opportunities as well. Removing true information from the 
decision-making realm can lead to failed transactions and perhaps 
other welfare-reducing market distortions. 
Moreover, in many scenarios, the consumer endorsement 
                                                          
11 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 216.  
12 See Deborah K. Owen & Joyce E. Plyler, The Role of Empirical 
Evidence in the Federal Regulation of Advertising, 10 J. PUB. POL. & 
MARKETING 1, 1 (1991) (“The [FTC] is charged with preventing false, unfair, 
and deceptive advertising . . . . [T]wo . . . questions must be answered . . . 
[W]hat messages does the advertisement communicate to consumers? . . . [A]re 
any of these messages materially false or misleading?”). Advertising regulation 
monitors and polices commercial information as aggregated into “messages.” 
See generally Richard Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices 
by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981 WISC. L. REV. 107, 108–09 (1981).  
13 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 200–03. 
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actually comprises part of the substance of the actual offering. The 
truthful consumer endorsement can offer legitimate hope to the 
recipient—it presents the upper boundary of an expected range of 
outcomes from a transaction. When netted out, does “taking hope 
off the market” advance consumer welfare? Does removing a 
lonely person’s hope that a dating service might bring them down 
the course toward marriage advance consumer welfare? Does 
removing hope that eating healthier sandwiches will induce 
weight-loss advance consumer welfare? 
Sometimes consumers contract for hope and are willing to 
accept disappointment. They expect to purchase a set of 
probabilities. This construct might apply to dining at unfamiliar 
restaurants, buying a new lawnmower, or buying an article of 
clothing. This might also apply to trying a new diet system, a gym 
membership, an acne-treatment cream, or a dating service. 
Consumers may indeed expect an offering to be imperfect or to 
perform below the highest level, but the information that the 
offering worked well for someone like them gives them the 
impetus to try it. As long as that hope is based on a realistic range 
of expectations, what is inherently wrong with offering that range 
of expectations? 
Ultimately, advocates of debiasing still must wrestle with a 
core normative problem. What constitutes “good” decision 
making? What constitutes a “good” outcome? Debiasing through 
law generally emphasizes promoting the former with a more casual 
emphasis on the latter. Nonetheless, as the consumer endorsement 
circumstance demonstrates, in order to answer either question, a 
view must be formed about the presentation of risk—and the 
promotion of risk. One person’s risk is another person’s hope, 
aspiration, or thrill. Debiasing still leaves policymakers with 
another intrusive, paternalistic judgment call to make. 
Part I of this Article describes the overall premise of debiasing 
through law, including its roots in behavioral law and economics. 
Then, Part I describes how debiasing works in theory and practice, 
using a comparison of product-safety regulation to advertising 
regulation. Focusing further on the underpinnings of advertising 
regulation, the Article explores the relationship between debiasing 
and regulatory control over the flow of commercial information to 
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consumers.  Operating within the sphere of advertising regulation, 
Part II uses the case study of consumer endorsements to illustrate 
and evaluate this attempt to debias through law. Here, the Article 
discusses several cognitive biases potentially exploited by 
consumer endorsements and evaluates how the regulatory changes 
address them. Part III explores the potential downside to the new 
regulation, specifically, a reduction in social welfare due to various 
market distortions, including transactions that fail due to 
insufficient information and disruptions in pricing. This part also 
raises a normative question unsolved by debiasing through law—
the degree to which risk should be present in the marketplace. Part 
IV prescribes a recommendation to policymakers that use 
debiasing techniques, suggesting that debiasing should be applied 
narrowly to certain markets because sweeping approaches tend to 
have more unanticipated potential pockets of downside. The 
Article concludes by reinforcing the notion that regulatory 
intervention in human decision making can yield positive results, 
but that the venues for deploying debiasing tactics should be 
carefully selected. 
I. THE PREMISE OF DEBIASING THROUGH LAW 
An understanding of the premise of debiasing through law 
requires a short description of behavioral law and economics 
because that is where debiasing finds its roots. Pure law and 
economics assumes that actors will behave rationally and respond 
predictably to incentives. Any errors that actors make in judgment 
will, according to the law and economics adherents, balance out in 
the aggregate and in the long run.14 Behavioral law and economics 
emphasizes that human beings are not disposed to behave 
rationally at all times and in all situations—human rationality is 
bounded.15 Delimiting those bounds can generate controversy, 
                                                          
14 This has been described as the “rational expectations hypothesis.” See 
John F. Muth, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, 29 
ECONOMETRICA 315, 316–17 (1961). 
15 Economist, policymaker, and controversial former Harvard University 
President Larry Summers once prefaced an unpublished article attacking the 
efficient-market and rational expectations hypothesis with the words, “THERE 
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particularly when policymakers attempt to incorporate and correct 
notions of bounded rationality.16  
People make certain judgment and perception errors 
consistently and in the same direction. These non-random errors do 
not “balance out” in the long run. Those who advocate for a 
debiasing approach suggest that regulators can address these biases 
and improve human decision making, however defined. 
Much of the current regulatory apparatus attempts to 
ameliorate the outcomes that result from bounded rationality, 
presuming that core human behavior proves highly resistant to 
external efforts to change it.17 Most of these traditional regulatory 
attempts to change behavior aim to “insulate” people from making 
injurious choices by restricting the choices available for them to 
make.18 The new debiasing-through-law approach presumes the 
                                                          
ARE IDIOTS. Look around.” Ryan Lizza, Inside the Crisis: Larry Summers and 
the White House Economic Team, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 2009, at 80, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/12/091012fa_fact_ 
lizza. Summers was not asserting frustrations with a world less rational than he; 
he was describing the natural cognitive limitations of all economic actors and 
decision makers. For more robust and general views of bounded rationality, see 
generally Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell 
Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); 
FRANCESCO PARISI & VERNON SMITH, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (2004). 
16 For example, well-established research supporting the existence of the 
endowment effect, which predicts that people are reluctant to trade what they 
already have for an item of equivalent value, has come under some fire. See 
supra note 11. The endowment effect, the initial identification of which largely 
has been attributed to Richard Thaler, has been a firmament in behavioral law 
and economics since the early 1980s. See generally Richard Thaler, Toward a 
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) 
[hereinafter Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory]. See infra Part II for a more 
detailed description of the endowment effect, its implications for the Coase 
Theorem, and the research that casts doubt on both its existence and the 
explanation for its existence. See also Plott & Zeiler, The Willingness Gap, 
supra note 10; Plott & Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries, supra note 10. 
17 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 200. 
18 Id.; Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for 
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2003). 
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persistence of a slew of irrational human-behavioral quirks and 
modifies rules to accommodate or address these quirks.   
Recently, applied behavioral law and economics has aspired to 
alter the behavior of actors without the harsh paternalism of 
removing people’s ultimate choices from the realm.19 The new 
emphasis of behavioral law and economics puts greater weight on 
improving the quality of individual decision making rather than on 
mitigating potential bad outcomes resulting from poor choices.20 
The core of the premise rests on the notion that if cognitive 
psychology affords regulators with knowledge of the consistent 
cognitive biases of human beings, regulators can counter, de-
program, or even leverage these biases.21 If policymakers know 
what heuristics or shortcuts people use to make decisions and how 
these heuristics can lead to error, they can generate awareness of 
these systematic errors, or counteract them, and improve decision 
making. Policymakers could employ regulatory tools to neutralize 
the decision-making “quirk” rather than dictate the outcome.22 
This Article analyzes a debiasing effort in the advertising 
regulation realm and assesses the effectiveness of that effort to 
enable extrapolation of some potential general lessons. This 
analysis requires an up-front foundational explanation of the 
mechanics of debiasing through law. 
                                                          
19 SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, supra note 7, at 4–14. 
20 See generally id.; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 200; Jolls, Sunstein 
& Thaler, supra note 15; Daniel McFadden, Free Markets and Fettered 
Consumers, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (2006). 
21 Much of the cognitive psychology and behavioral economics research 
into the endowment effect has been performed in human laboratory experiments. 
For a survey of this research and an overview of the broader reaction to it, see 
Christopher Curran, The Endowment Effect, in 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 819, 819–21 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
Though the results of the experiments should not be dismissed wholesale, the 
artificiality and errors of this setting should inject some caution into those who 
might rely upon them for assessing the effects of policy or tweaking policy. 
22 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 200–01. See generally Camerer et 
al., supra note 7; Sunstein & Thaler, Not an Oxymoron, supra note 7; Thaler & 
Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 7; SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, 
supra note 7. 
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A. One Key Challenge of Debiasing: The Endowment Effect 
A full understanding of the cognitive forces at work in 
transactional decision making requires exposure to some brief 
foundational background about the endowment effect. The 
endowment effect describes a phenomenon where people tend to 
overvalue wealth or objects with which they are initially endowed. 
Advertising attempts to induce transactions and the endowment 
effect may present a force that the advertiser must counter through 
persuasive tactics. The true power and nature of the endowment 
effect remains unsettled to some, which concededly complicates 
the transactional decision equation, but only to a degree.23   
This section describes the endowment effect debate with the 
caveat that a bounded understanding of the cognitive biases should 
perhaps make regulators a bit more cautious when attempting to 
neutralize or leverage them to improve human decision making.24 
Setting this foundation facilitates exploration of the mechanics of 
debiasing through law, as applied to product-safety regulation, 
advertising regulation, and more broadly, control over the flow of 
information.  
The endowment effect may drive an observed behavior where 
people tend to value something that they own at a higher mark than 
an equivalent item offered in exchange.25  This puts a drag on the 
tendency to exchange or trade. There may be a biological or 
evolutionary explanation for this phenomenon left over from an 
epoch when it was considerably more risky to give something up 
than to retain it.26 This prehistoric explanation has competed with a 
                                                          
23 With or without the weight of an endowment effect, advertisers must and 
still do tap into long-recognized cognitive biases to induce transactions. 
24 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral 
Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1056 (2000) [hereinafter, Bainbridge, 
Mandatory Disclosure]. Regulators may be prone to the same biases and 
cognitive errors as those they regulate and protect. 
25 See Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory, supra note 16. See generally 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and the Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 
193, 197–99 (1991). 
26 Sarah F. Brosnan & Owen D. Jones, Law, Biology, and Property: A New 
Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 1956–61 
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purely economic explanation—actors in transactions are more 
reluctant to part with what they have if they perceive that there is 
counterparty risk.27 
The knotty problem of the endowment effect, if not explained 
away by counterparty risk, presents a basic illustration of conflict 
between law and economics and behavioral law and economics.28 
For example, the Coase Theorem is premised on the notion that 
initial allocation of property rights is irrelevant for ultimate 
efficient allocation of property, and that the sole friction that would 
prevent this ultimate state from materializing results from 
transaction costs.29 If the National Football League allocated 
tickets to the Superbowl through a random lottery, the Coase 
Theorem would predict that the recipients of the tickets would 
trade them to people who had a stronger natural preference to 
attend the game. Small-scale social experiments have indicated 
that this would not be the likely result. The lottery winners would 
be much more likely to use the ticket and attend the game because 
of the endowment effect.30 Recent research31 and conjecture have 
put the significance of that result in doubt, which presents some 
challenges and urges some caution for making policy from this 
social science.32 
                                                          
(2008). For a brief discussion of the evolutionary background behind decision 
making, see McFadden, supra note 20, at 7–8. 
27 That is, the risk of the other party not fulfilling the commitment. See 
Carney, supra note 10; Wright, supra note 10; Smith, supra note 10. 
28 Though this Article does not have a mission to litigate the issue, the 
existence and impact of the endowment effect has been strongly called into 
question. See, e.g., Plott & Zeiler, The Willingness Gap, supra note 10; Plott & 
Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries, supra note 10.  
29 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 
(1960). 
30 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 
1344–45 (1990). Also note, the “status quo” bias may also intersect here. The 
status quo bias would also support the behavioral attitude to desiring to keep 
what one already has. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 25, at 197–99. 
31 See, e.g., Plott & Zeiler, The Willingness Gap, supra note 10; Plott & 
Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries, supra note 10. 
32 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing counterparty risk). 
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The degree of acceptance of the legitimacy of the endowment 
effect can be critical to understanding debiasing through law, 
because marketing and advertising purpose themselves to address 
it. Marketing and advertising attempt to induce a purchase: to 
induce consumers to part with wealth in exchange for an 
offering.33 If one anticipates a vital endowment effect,34 one can 
understand marketers’ need and purpose for massive doses of 
persuasive advertising.35 In order to drive transactions, marketers 
must use advertising to enhance the perceived value of an 
offering,36 an offering presumably presented at a competitive 
market price. Some offerings may require more persuasion than 
others to sell at a viable price for producers, when the brand or 
offering might be unfamiliar or appear risky to try. 
Essentially, marketers and regulators (presumably acting on the 
behalf of consumers) engage in a tug-of-war over which 
psychological tactics constitute “fair game” in the inducement of a 
transaction.37  
                                                          
See also David Dunning, George Loewenstein & Leaf Van Boven, Egocentric 
Empathy Gaps between Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment 
Effect, 79 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 66, 73–75 (2000) (raising a new 
notion that empathy gaps between transactors may drive the endowment effect 
gap and that this gap may not be easily addressable through debiasing that 
employs empathetic efforts). 
33 Marketing and advertising aim to move the consumer to part with a 
dollar to buy a can of soda, but also a specific brand of cola. 
34 And also related prospect theory. See infra note 176. 
35 The three leading advertising spenders in the United States in 2009 were 
companies managing established brands. Procter & Gamble Co. spent $4.2 
billion, Verizon Communications spent $3.0 billion, and AT&T spent $2.8 
billion. Marketer Trees: 2010, Database of 100 Leading National Advertisers, 
AD AGE (Jun. 21, 2010), http://adage.com/marketertrees2010/.  
36 And reduce perceived risks related to the transaction. 
37 Necessarily factoring into this tug-of-war, the First Amendment also 
restricts regulation of commercial speech. The current doctrine is largely drawn 
off the line of cases evolving from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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B. The Mechanics of Debiasing 
The techniques that advertisers use to counteract the 
endowment effect (or simply to persuade) often rely upon 
leveraging the optimism bias, the availability heuristic, the framing 
effect, and a host of other cognitive quirks that they can tap.38 
Advertising regulation purports to make this contest fair, however 
defined.39 Though false information certainly cannot be conveyed 
as part of advertising, misleading information can be trickier to 
identify and may present the more challenging regulatory 
dilemmas. Regulators must balance the need to promote 
conveyance of information and the free flow of welfare-producing 
transactions against notions of fairness—no small challenge. 
Debiasing through law purports to offer a subtle solution. The 
debiasing premise would dictate that policymakers not ban outright 
certain types of advertising, which would effectively have the hard 
(as opposed to soft) paternalistic40 result of effectively removing 
choice from consumers. Certain products may only sell well using 
certain techniques. This may be for the better or the worse, but if 
advertising techniques for certain products are eliminated, choice 
through product availability may diminish, if not completely, 
almost so.   
Debiasing proponents would argue for counter-programming 
campaigns of sorts that would foster improved consumer decision 
making about the purchase. As Jolls and Sunstein note: 
[T]he law of deceptive advertising is thus a form of 
debiasing through substantive law; like our proposed 
approach here, it adopts a middle ground between inaction 
                                                          
38 Presumably, they are drawing upon both formal and informal 
understandings of human cognitive biases. See infra Part II for descriptions and 
illustrations of these cognitive quirks. 
39 Section 5 of the FTC Act “prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.” Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (West 2010) 
(emphasis added). See Craswell, supra note 12 for a comprehensive exploration 
of the conceptual and practical challenges of defining “unfairness.” 
40 See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and 
Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660–62 
(2004) (distinguishing hard paternalism from soft paternalism). 
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or naïve informational strategies on one hand, and . . . 
strategies of heightened liability standards or outright bans, 
on the other. Of course, the law of deceptive advertising 
concerns limits on affirmative statements (advertisements) 
firms choose to undertake, while [debiasing through law] 
concerns requirements that firms affirmatively provide 
information in particular ways; but in both cases the 
underlying attempt is to use law to reduce the severity of 
consumer error.41 
Debiasing aims to strike a balance by generating improved 
consumer decisions in an arena where consumers are bombarded 
by marketers with both discrete bits and vivid narrative 
presentations of commercial information. 
1. The Product-Safety Analogy 
Product-safety law provides a stark illustration of the stakes 
that those who would use debiasing through law for advertising are 
trying to address, and a helpful bridge to analyzing commercial 
advertising regulation. Both product-safety regulation and 
advertising regulation try to control information and product 
availability while maximizing consumer choice and minimizing 
consumer risk or danger.42 Product-safety law may provide some 
clues about why the FTC may have come up short in their goals 
with the new regulations for consumer endorsements, when both 
are viewed through the approach of debiasing through law.43 
(Conversely, an examination of consumer endorsements may 
ultimately inform a better understanding of debiasing through law.) 
With product safety, regulators attempt to inform consumers of 
the risks of product danger in a manner that overcomes the natural 
optimism bias.44 However, a few complications emerge that 
prevent an enabling of an accurate risk assessment by the 
consumer: 
                                                          
41 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 216. 
42 In sum, these regulations optimize consumer welfare. 
43 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 207. 
44 See infra Part II.C.1 for additional discussion of the optimism bias. 
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Various commentators . . . have emphasized [that] 
optimism bias may lead many consumers to underestimate 
their personal risks even if they receive accurate 
information about average risks—a problem that may arise 
whenever the key piece of information to be disclosed to 
individuals is a probability estimate (such as the risk of 
harm from a product) rather than a certain outcome.45 
Given these consumer proclivities, what can product-safety 
regulators do? The options product-safety regulators can consider 
start with a total a-paternalistic (or libertarian / caveat emptor) 
approach, putting the product on the market and allowing 
consumers to learn about the product’s safety attributes purely 
through word-of-mouth or direct experience.46 That is, an absence 
of regulation that requires no disclosure and no tweaking of the 
product to make it safer, which would require torts-driven private 
assessments of risk management.47 Leaving the calculations 
entirely to private actors could be costly—and much of our 
product-safety regimen maintains well-established social and 
regulatory roots that reflect the notion that the tort system alone 
cannot promote a desired aggregate level of safety and that 
prevention of actual harm through regulatory mandates may be 
required. 48 
                                                          
45 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 207. 
46 In reality, this option does not often exist. Automobile manufacturers, for 
example, must achieve certain safety thresholds to let their products go to 
market. Above that minimum standard lies a zone for consumers to trade off 
price, features, and safety. See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. 
Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Regulation, 24 J. L. & ECON. 491, 
492–93 (1981). 
47 Note that in the absence of regulation, tort law would predict that 
producers would seek the proper mixture of disclosure, enhanced safety, and 
acceptable risk. There is a vast literature on product liability law (and associated 
law and economics) that this Article recognizes but does not have adequate 
room to address. 
48 For an historic call to action to prevent consumer injury, see generally 
RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965). For an overview of government intervention to 
promote food and drug safety, see generally PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING 
AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
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The next approach on the spectrum could be categorized as 
“weak-form” debiasing. This approach would be the provision of 
raw statistical risk information to the consumer, while leaving the 
product on the market. Under most circumstances, this approach 
proves somewhat ineffective because consumers make “systemic 
mistakes in the assessment of probabilities.”49   
Advocates of the “strong-form” (or the standard) debiasing 
approach would posit that making available a “concrete instance of 
the occurrence”50 would be most effective, while not intrusive, nor 
completely hands-off.51 A “truthful narrative[] of harm [would 
provide] a more modest and measured approach to optimism bias” 
than approaches that might be more paternalistic or “over-the-top” 
in their messaging to consumers.52 These techniques are guided 
toward improving decision making unobtrusively without the 
heavy hand of removing choice from the market. Choice generally, 
and choice to transact, has an inherent value53 and should not be 
casually eliminated by regulators if people can consider the choice 
in a properly informed manner.54 Long before Milton Friedman 
                                                          
REGULATION (2004). 
49 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 210. 
50 I.e., “[I]n the consumer safety context the law might require that the real 
life story of an accident or injury be printed in large type and displayed 
prominently . . . .” Id. at 213 (emphasis added). For example, presenting 
“truthful narratives of harm.” Id. at 215. Presentation of so-called worst-case 
scenarios can cause consumers to either unduly overreact or simply tune out. Id. 
at 214–15. 
51 See id. at 210. 
52 Id. at 215. An aggressive approach might be exemplified by the well-
known ad where an egg was displayed, with the narrator proclaiming, “This is 
your brain,” and then after the egg hits a hot frying pan, continuing, “This is 
your brain on drugs.” Shaila K. Dewan, The New Public Service Ad: Just Say 
“Deal with It,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004. 
53 For a survey about perceived value of choice, see Sheena S. Iyengar & 
Mark R. Lepper, Rethinking the Value of Choice: A Cultural Perspective on 
Intrinsic Motivation, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 349, 349–50 (1999). 
54 With product safety, choice can be eliminated by a direct mandate to 
remove the product from the market entirely, raising disclosure requirements to 
a level where consumers will almost universally reject the offer (effectively 
removing choice), or raising safety features to an unreasonably protective level 
that makes the offering cost-prohibitive (again, effectively removing choice). 
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and Rose Friedman put the phrase “Free to Choose” into the 
popular lexicon,55 Thomas Jefferson noted, “[f]reedom is the right 
to choose: the right to create for oneself the alternatives of choice. 
Without the possibility of choice, and the exercise of choice, a man 
is not a man but a member, an instrument, a thing.”56 In the 
consumer-transaction context, freedom can be expressed even 
through the bountiful variety found in a grocery cart.57 
Moving along the paternalism spectrum, using product safety 
as the baseline illustration, regulators can employ “insulating” 
strategies, which begin to slide toward “hard” paternalism and 
removal of ultimate choice for the consumer.58 These strategies 
aim to protect the consumer from defects by elevating safety 
standards to burdensome levels. The costs of the insulated product 
can cause potential transactions to fail because risk has been 
almost entirely stripped from the offering. This paternalistic 
approach assumes that consumers should not be permitted to trade 
off price or other features for risk. The example reductio ad 
absurdum would be if regulators required automobiles to be 
designed to prevent all fatalities, rendering them too expensive for 
everyday use. Individuals would be prevented from making the 
“un-insulated,” “risky,” “dangerous” choice of purchasing and 
owning a car, but would lose the freedom to choose a precious 
means of transportation.59 
At the far end of the spectrum, the ultimate strategy that would 
                                                          
See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
55 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO 
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1980). 
56 Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 53, at 349. This quote has also been 
attributed to modernist American poet and Librarian of Congress, Archibald 
MacLeish. See, e.g., DEREK HUMPHRY, LAWFUL EXIT: THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM 
FOR HELP IN DYING 8 (1993); FRANK OBERLE, FINDING HOME: A WAR CHILD’S 
JOURNEY TO PEACE 275 (2004). 
57 But see generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY 
MORE IS LESS (2005) (concluding that an excess of choice can generate 
unhappiness for the chooser). 
58 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
59 For a rich discussion of the inevitable tragedies of cost-benefit analysis 
in a resource-constrained environment, see generally PHILIP BOBBIT & GUIDO 
CALABRESI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
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truly eliminate risk exposure for the consumer would be an 
outright ban of an offering. This ultimate paternalistic approach 
eliminates all choice for the consumer. It fails to improve 
consumer transactional decision making and it leaves absolutely no 
room for absorbing any level of acceptable risk.60 
2. Product Safety Compared with Advertising Regulation 
Product-safety regulation provides a crisp illustration of the 
regulatory approaches available for protecting consumers—
ranging from zero regulatory protection, to enhancement of 
decision-making through debiasing through law, to reducing 
choice through insulation from outcomes, to eliminating choice 
completely. As noted previously, advertising regulation can be 
treated as a form of debiasing through law. At the very least, 
advertising regulation provides a unique testing ground for 
debiasing through law. 
Chilling consumer endorsements (or effectively eliminating 
them), certainly reflects an effort to enhance regulation, to control 
more tightly the flow of information from the marketer to the 
consumer.61 At first glance, a crackdown on consumer 
endorsements resembles an effort to control information to 
enhance consumer decision making. It does not resemble an 
insulation strategy, as the offerings endorsed are not required to 
change, nor are offerings outright banned. One could look at this 
effort as a soft, non-intrusive (but still softly paternalistic) means 
of improving the considerations people mix into decisions to 
transact—a classic example of debiasing through law.62 
A second look, one which this Article will explore in greater 
detail, reveals that a crackdown on consumer endorsements—
effectively regulating commercial information flow by removing 
true information from that flow—can certainly have the power to 
                                                          
60 See generally Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
61 The changes in consumer-endorsement regulation will be explored in 
significant detail infra Part II. 
62 For better or worse, by removing a tool from the marketer’s arsenal, 
regulators have made it incrementally more difficult for marketers to counter the 
influence of the endowment effect on consumers. 
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“improve” the quality of consumer decision making, but can also 
have other possible side effects that might prove less desirable 
when considering total social welfare.   
For example, there are some products or services that present 
an arguably “acceptable” amount of consumer risk. As will be 
discussed, occasionally a consumer endorsement is designed to 
induce the consumer to take a calculated risk, and sometimes the 
product or service offering is focused around risk per se. If 
regulation of a marketing practice is too heavy-handed and the 
practice becomes too risky to employ, the practice may disappear 
entirely. If the practice disappears entirely, certain types of 
offerings dependent on the practice will disappear. This might 
increase social welfare with certain transactions63 and it might 
subtract with others.64 If advertising regulation is debiasing 
through law, advertising-regulation initiatives should be closely 
scrutinized to see if debiasing actually works as intended by 
proponents.65  
C. Debiasing, Advertising, and Information Flow 
Regulators are concerned with preventing “bad,” social-
welfare-destroying transactions from reaching completion. Note 
that “bad” transactions present themselves affirmatively. Injuries, 
failed results, and complaints resulting from disappointed 
                                                          
63 The FTC’s commissioned studies on the weight-loss industry may 
demonstrate that the effective elimination of consumer endorsements in that 
industry, and the subsequent disappearance of the offering, might enhance 
consumer welfare. HASTAK & MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3; HASTAK & 
MAZIS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 3. 
64 The Subway sandwich campaign discussed at length, infra Part II, may 
provide an example of where effectively eliminating consumer endorsements 
might reduce consumer welfare. On-line dating services that use married 
couples who met through their service may provide another illustration. The 
Article later suggests a middle ground where the FTC, instead of leveling a 
blanket threat, addresses industry-specific behavior under the broader 
enforcement powers of Section 5 of the FTC Act, or similarly through the Food 
and Drug Administration. 
65 And again, vice-versa—advertising regulation can inform the broader 
picture of debiasing, just as the breastfeeding advertising campaign did. 
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expectations are tangible to regulators.66 Therefore, regulators 
often try to address what they can easily see,67 or tackle problems 
related to something dramatically unpleasant that recently 
happened.68 
For example, by tightening down on consumer endorsements, 
the FTC attempted to purify the information flow from producers 
to consumers in order to create a transactional environment where 
consumers become less prone to acting on misperceptions and 
erroneous extrapolations from true individual consumer 
experiences. As the Article explains, this novel debiasing 
approach—an approach that involves using information and 
presentation to improve decision making—can yield imperfect 
results, illustrations of which are available. The new consumer-
endorsement regulations attempt to improve decision making with 
a seemingly benign design.69 But the welfare impact of the change 
                                                          
66 This applies across the regulatory board. The Food and Drug 
Administration’s drug approval process has at certain junctures been regarded as 
too cautious. See Robert Pear, Faster Approval of AIDS Drugs Is Urged, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at B12. The modern process can trace some of its legacy 
to the thalidomide tragedy in the 1950s. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 
55, at 202–05; see also generally, Linda Bren, Frances Oldham Kelsey: FDA 
Medical Reviewer Leaves Her Mark on History, 35 FDA CONSUMER MAG., 
Mar.–Apr. 2001, available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps1609/www. 
fda.gov/fdac/features/2001/201_kelsey.html. Approving a dangerous drug is 
visible. Libertarians have argued that the social costs of over-caution in drug 
approval can be less visible, but that over-caution may be just as socially 
expensive. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 204–10; Gary S. Becker, 
Get the FDA Out of the Way and Prices Will Drop, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 16, 
2002, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_37/ 
b3799028.htm. 
67 See, e.g., Omnipresent advertisements for “free credit reports” that 
confused consumers resulted in FTC Action. Free Annual File Disclosures Rule: 
Final Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose Amending the Rule To Prevent 
Deceptive Marketing of Free Credit Reports, Pursuant to Section 205 of the 
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 16 
C.F.R. § 610 (2010). 
68 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), passed in part “to protect consumers 
from abusive financial services practices . . . .” that revealed themselves in the 
years just prior to passage of the legislation. Id. 
69 FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials, 
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may be ambiguous and uneven across markets. From a normative 
perspective, these regulations may turn out to be more rigidly 
paternalistic than intended. They may indeed remove choice from 
the marketplace, more than regulators might anticipate.70 These 
results can inform a broader understanding of debiasing through 
law. 
Voluntary transactions in the marketplace generate positive 
social welfare, net of any externalities, because the assumption is 
that the parties would not have entered into the trade if each were 
not put in a better position. The assumption is that the trade 
represents the best available option for each party to improve its 
position and that the end result will prove to be Pareto optimal.71  
Welfare economics finds that regulatory action is justified 
only when a specific market imperfection is evident and 
when the benefit from correcting that market imperfection 
exceeds the cost of properly regulating the market. If a 
market imperfection is not apparent, or if the benefits of 
correcting that imperfection are small, then intervention 
risks causing more harm than good to social welfare.72  
                                                          
supra note 1. “Under the revised Guides, advertisements that feature a consumer 
and convey his or her experience with a product or service as typical when that 
is not the case will be required to clearly disclose the results that consumers can 
generally expect.” Id. On the surface, this sounds like a means of facilitating 
commerce fairly, but as this paper explores, more implications must be 
considered. 
70 For example, if regulators provide consumers with information about the 
risks of eating chocolate, if the information is too alarming, chocolate will cease 
to be a real choice. Regulators can scare decision makers away from a choice 
that then renders the choice extinct, even for others who would choose it in spite 
of exposure to and true absorption of the information. Other distortions can 
happen from removing information from the marketplace. For example, if 
regulators forbid price-based advertising, total prices may rise, which may 
reduce choice and welfare. See infra Part III. 
71 “[A] policy change is socially desirable [and meets the Pareto criterion] 
if, by the change, everyone can be made better off, or at least some are made 
better off, while no one is made worse off.” RICHARD E. JUST, DARRELL L. 
HUETH & ANDREW SCHMITZ, THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 14 
(2004). 
72 J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality 
Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION, L. & ECON. 349, 366–67 (2006). 
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Debiasing through law describes a type of regulatory intervention, 
a means of correcting imperfections. Engaging in this type of 
intervention requires an understanding of the underlying nature of 
the regulated transactions. 
Debiasing should disrupt or improve “bad” transactions. A 
“bad” transaction can be rooted in contracting norms as well as 
welfare economics.73 “Bad” transactions often result from “bad” 
information polluting the transaction environment, distorting 
expectations about what will be exchanged.74 A “bad” transaction 
could also arise from scenarios where the parties, ex-ante, err (or 
engage in deceit, mild or aggressive) in their valuation of what 
they are surrendering or receiving.75   
These ex-ante errors are significant because the law of contract 
is notoriously reluctant to undo or revisit transactions that are 
merely unbalanced or one-sided. Generally, a party must show that 
there is something seriously deficient with the process of the 
formation of the transaction for the agreement to be undone. The 
defenses of duress,76 undue influence,77 and unconscionability,78 
for example, all require inquiries into the transaction process in 
order for a party to succeed.79  
For the purposes of this Article, “bad” transactions can be 
translated into welfare terms. When Party X makes a decision 
based on a distorted perception from information proffered by 
Party Y, and the distorted decision devalues transactional outcome 
for Party X, Party X obviously loses welfare. That creates a social 
concern. If Party Y is the counterparty and creator of 
misperception in this exchange, and Party Y gains more in welfare 
than Party X loses, this exchange might enhance welfare in a one-
                                                          
See, e.g., MICHAEL KATZ & HARVEY ROSEN, MICROECONOMICS 398–99 (3d ed. 
1998). 
73 See Beales et al., supra note 46, at 505–06. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175–176 (1981). 
77 Id. § 177. 
78 Id. § 208 cmt. b. 
79 Improper threats, the exercise of dominion over a party, and “defects” in 
the bargaining process are threaded throughout these defenses. 
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round game. But in a multiple round game, the destruction of trust 
will cast a pall over future transactions, ultimately reducing 
welfare, as fewer welfare-creating transactions and exchanges will 
likely result.80 Regulation of advertising should attempt to 
maximize social welfare with fairness as the constraint.81 Over-
regulating advertising might have the same welfare-reducing 
effects as the open permission of bad transactions, if information 
proves insufficient for consumers to engage heartily in social-
welfare-yielding transactions. 
1. Advertising Regulation and Debiasing  
Before entering the narrower problem of consumer-
endorsement regulation, taking a step back to consider advertising 
regulation more broadly can provide context. Advertising 
regulation, as embodied in the Federal Trade Commission Act82 
(and “baby” FTC Acts at the state level),83 focuses broadly on 
unfair or deceptive practices that generate transactions through the 
inducement of ex-ante errors on the part of the consumer.84 
Presumably, an atmosphere of deception promoted by an advertiser 
would lead to a “bad” transaction—a failure to yield net instant or 
long-run social welfare, an unjust redistribution of surplus to the 
advertiser from the consumer, or perhaps, all of the above. 
Regulators often focus concern on transactions that are induced 
                                                          
80 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON 488 (1970).  
81 See generally Craswell, supra note 12. 
82 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41–58 (West 2010). 
83 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the 
California State Bar: Deceptive and Unfair Acts and Practices Principles: 
Evolution and Convergence 6–7 (May 18, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070518evolutionandconvergence.pdf) 
(comparing FTC Act with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200). 
84 In 1981, Richard Craswell surveyed the constitution of “unfair acts or 
practices,” including “withholding material information” (which has direct 
applicability to the advertising environment) and “unsubstantiated advertising 
claims.” See generally Craswell, supra note 12, at 107–09. For a 
contemporaneous analysis of the challenges of defining deceptive advertising, 
see Beales et al., supra note 46, at 495–501, 516–21. 
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by one party through the exploitation of a hard-wired 
predisposition of a consumer to make certain cognitive errors or 
systematic misjudgments.85 There are some tactics of 
psychological manipulation that may unfairly induce transactions. 
Obviously, the regulation of the information presentation that 
induces cognitive error must be done with a high level of care, and 
not just for purposes of compliance with the First Amendment.86   
When advertising is disaggregated, portions of it will be pure 
presentation of the product, the price, and availability. These 
essentials comprise the core of advertising. When these essentials 
are subtracted from the whole of a piece of advertising, the 
remaining “residue” is pure persuasion. The attractive people 
depicted drinking beer on a tropical beach, the happy family 
depicted playing the board game, the free offer, the call to “buy 
now because supplies are limited,”87 all reflect tactics that 
persuade, yet convey almost none of the core substantive 
information about the product. 
Much of advertising regulation and debiasing through law 
focuses on controlling, managing, or addressing this “residue.”88 It 
bears emphasizing again that Jolls and Sunstein contend that 
debiasing through law aptly describes the approach of advertising 
regulation.89 Of paramount importance for protecting consumer 
decision making is controlling the purity of market information 
and its presentation. However, if regulatory control over the 
                                                          
85 For an example of the multiple sociological and cognitive manipulations 
involved with so-called “free offer” advertising, see generally David Adam 
Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49 (2008).  
86 See supra note 37. 
87 This tactic triggers the scarcity effect. For an empirical demonstration, 
see generally Akanbi Adewole, Jerry Lee & Stephen Worchel, Effects of Supply 
and Demand on Ratings of Object Value, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
904 (1975). 
88 The use of the term “residue” should not imply that persuasion is 
unimportant to marketers.  Persuasion tactics are extremely important and 
ingrained in our commercial culture.  Entities invest heavily in creating brand 
identities that attempt to persuade.  See Desai R. Desai & Spencer Weber 
Waller, Brands, Competition and the Law, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545893. 
89 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 216. 
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market information tightens unduly, consumers may also be put in 
a suboptimal position. Consumers benefit from the unilateral (or 
occasionally interactive) communications to which advertisers 
expose them in all media, presuming that the content of these 
communications is truthful and the persuasive residue “fair.” 
Availability, price, and differentiation all guide the consumer 
toward opportunities to make an exchange that could enhance total 
welfare and make both parties better off. 
Nonetheless, “bad” transactions present a real concern and the 
changes to consumer-endorsement regulation are but one microbe 
in a broad federal, state, and self-regulatory environment90 that 
targets this concern. Although regulation may throw out good 
transactions with the bad, some of the prevented transactions may 
well indeed be bad transactions. Studies launched by the FTC have 
demonstrated that in certain instances, when consumers are 
presented with a consumer telling the story of an exceptional result 
from the offering, it raises the expected experience to be above that 
of the typical experience.91 
Accordingly, there is a subtle result—a precarious balance—
that regulators should seek. Certainly, “bad” transactions should be 
prevented, but preventing them should be done in the most 
effective and efficient way. The new regulatory approach does not 
impose a de jure legal prohibition on consumer endorsements, but 
they are, from their very design, aimed to severely impede them to 
the point where consumer endorsements might be almost too 
prohibitive to employ. As this Article describes in Part II, by 
ratcheting up the costs and raising the risk of legal exposure related 
to this method of delivering information, the FTC effectively 
addresses all consumer endorsements in the same manner. All of 
the “bad” transactions that would have been generated by 
consumer endorsements would simply not occur. Taken alone, this 
would be a positive social development.   
However, at least two types of “good” transactions that might 
                                                          
90 “Private” or self-regulation would include industry norms and third-party 
groups like the Better Business Bureau and Underwriters Laboratory. See Beales 
et al., supra note 46, at 501–02. 
91 See HASTAK & MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3; HASTAK & MAZIS, 
DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 3. 
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be induced through this method would get swept out with the bad: 
(1) The transactions that required the consumer endorsement “jolt” 
to boost the consumer incentive to transact, and then put the 
consumer in a satisfactory position ex post; and (2) The 
transactions that were really about “hope” as much as anything 
else. Some transactions may fit into both of these typologies. 
The second category of transactions (“hope”) presents a 
difficult category of transactions for regulators to address. 
Regulators are not in any way taking the offering feature of hope 
completely off the market, but with consumer endorsement 
restrictions, they are removing the opportunity for producers to use 
true outcomes from their offerings to present consumers with a 
hope to which they can aspire.92 The “hope” in this instance for the 
consumer would be the possibility of achieving the actual outcome 
that the consumer endorser experienced. 
Concededly, examples of potentially “bad” transactions that 
use hope and consumer endorsements to induce transactions are 
commonplace. Weight-loss program offerings and “business-
opportunities” programs have potential to magnify the 
effectiveness of the advertising tactic.93 With dietary supplements, 
the FTC produced two empirical studies to demonstrate the 
potential cognitive distortive effect on expected product results.94 
With so-called “get-rich-quick” business-opportunity offerings, the 
expectations and results are also easily quantifiable.95 If the new 
consumer-endorsement guides merely altered the nature of this 
particular family of transactions and precisely rebalanced the 
cognitive playing field within this family, that could be easily 
justifiable. Other socially-valuable communications, however, 
could get swept away with a broad, blanketed approach. 
For illustration, consider the chiropractor who wishes to induce 
customers to try controversial chiropractic therapy through her 
clinic.96 She publishes a website with true testimonials of 
                                                          
92 Because the tactic has become more expensive and riskier to implement, 
producers are disincentivized from using “hope.” 
93 See HASTAK & MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3. 
94 Id.; HASTAK & MAZIS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 3. 
95 See HASTAK & MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3. 
96 Assume that her clinic is on a state border, opening her interstate 
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exceptional results, designed to lure skeptics to have hope that her 
services can help. Perhaps this inducement might be able to help 
someone. Arguably, the new consumer-endorsement guides would 
help to mitigate any questionable trade practices, but other 
narrowly-targeted mechanisms exist for that purpose.97 
Questionable trade practices can be addressed with precision rather 
than through overly-broad regulation. 
Or consider an illustration that might be closer to home for 
readers of a law review article. A law school that showcases 
“student profiles” on its website, or profiles of recent alumni, may 
be transmitting experiences that are exceptional, not average. The 
profiles may indeed present true experiences, but law schools 
certainly design them to induce the potential applicant to take a 
closer look at the school, apply, and matriculate if accepted. 
Consumer endorsements are certainly not without social value 
in given situations, but they should nonetheless be monitored. 
“Bad” transactions can certainly be induced by the presentation of 
outlier consumer endorsements, and regulators should be on 
heightened alert when these endorsements are used. However, by 
implementing the new consumer-endorsement guides, the FTC 
may have painted with too broad a brush. The FTC could simply 
have relied on its authority under the FTC Act to commence civil 
enforcement actions in specific “problem” industries without 
transmitting a general, strong warning about the tactic. 
Perhaps the FTC should apply more scrutiny toward marketers 
that use this advertising tactic, but should operate with a 
discretionary stiletto rather than the proverbial hatchet. Some 
forms of hope have value and are less risky to leave unfettered in 
the marketplace. Other forms of hope can be quite damaging if 
expected, then dashed.98 
2. Regulating Information Flow 
Debiasing through law, when meshed with the consumer 
                                                          
business to nominal FTC scrutiny. 
97 E.g., actions under section 5 of the FTC Act or state “baby FTC Acts.” 
98 See infra Part II.C.1. 
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regulatory arena, distills the control of information transmitted 
through advertising or other disclosures. Depending on the 
situation and ultimate goal, regulators have mandated the addition 
of information to the flow, the removal or banning of false 
information, but also, interestingly, the removal of true 
information from the marketplace.99 To contextualize properly 
where consumer-endorsement regulation fits into the consumer law 
picture, this Article next presents examples of each of these 
regulatory mandates, starting with mandates to add information 
into advertising. 
i. Adding Information 
People can make decision errors due to the absence of relevant 
information that would help them make better choices and 
debiasing can address this problem.100 Sometimes adding this 
information provides raw data for the decision maker to consume, 
other times this information can be skillfully woven into the fabric 
of the decision-making process. Adding a narrative about a death 
resulting from smoking, for example, gives consumers raw 
information that they likely already have (smoking is hazardous), 
but also adds the information in a manner that tends to stick. 
These decision errors may not necessarily be curable, but 
providing the information (or mandating its provision) to the 
decision maker represents a method of debiasing. The Truth in 
Lending Act,101 which provides for mandatory, uniform 
disclosures from lenders, provides an example of a regulatory 
debiasing mechanism for adding information.102 Whether these 
                                                          
99 Beales et al., sought to define regulatory “information remedies” to solve 
consumer market failures, categorizing the remedies as “(a) removing restraints 
on information; (b) correcting misleading information; (c) encouraging 
additional information.” Beales et al, supra note 46, at 513–31. The authors note 
that “remedying deficiencies in the information market is in some ways a more 
complex and subtle task than regulating product markets directly.” Id. at 514. 
100 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 207. 
101 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et. seq. (West 2010). 
102 For a cautionary tale about “glibly” using mandatory disclosure as a 
panacea in the securities regulation context, see Bainbridge, Mandatory 
FRIEDMAN - FINAL2.DOC 5/17/2011  12:45 PM 
570 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
pieces of additional information are heeded by decision makers, or 
whether they improve decision making, can be a situational 
question. Over-disclosure can overwhelm consumers with too 
much information.103 The marginal information may also prove 
insufficient to overcome the optimism bias.104  
Even if the information is absorbed, the additional information 
may yield lower utility for the recipient. Ignorance can, indeed, be 
bliss.105 Mandating disclosure about the FDA’s standard for 
acceptable number of rodent hairs permissible in peanut butter 
(through a big orange sticker on the jar bearing a picture of a rat) 
may extinguish a potential transaction that would otherwise create 
welfare. This would be an inverted restatement of the old saying, 
“What you don’t know won’t hurt you.” 
Mandating disclosure of information to the consumer (adding 
information) constitutes a classic form of debiasing. Adding 
information changes how consumers calculate the risks and 
benefits of a potential transaction and make decisions. The initial 
                                                          
Disclosure, supra note 24, at 1058–59 (2000). 
103 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 
516; Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 
10-008, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567284 (arguing that 
widespread mandatory disclosure has failed to protect consumers and may cause 
harm). 
104 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 207. See Howard Latin, “Good” 
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 
1243–44 (1994).  
105 See Christian Turner, The Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297, 
299 (2009):  
Sometimes we are better off not knowing things. This near-aphorism is 
unremarkable when understood as an observation about our everyday 
lives. Do you really want to know the day, time, and circumstances of 
your own death? Do you want to know the details of your children’s (or 
parents’) love lives? Do you want to know whether your neighbors are 
scrupulous in paying their taxes? To these, and many questions like 
them, we answer almost reflexively, “I’d rather not know.” We are 
happier, indeed better off by many measures, if ignorant. . . . Despite 
the advantages knowledge often confers, ignorance is sometimes 
preferable because it shields us from unpleasant realities, keeps us from 
facing difficult choices, or immunizes us against attack by others. 
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burden of the costs borne from the added regulatory burden falls 
on advertisers. Policymakers would hope that the welfare gains 
from consumer empowerment would exceed any losses created by 
this extra burden.106 
ii. Removing False or Misleading Information 
Section 5 of the FTC Act forms the basic core of advertising 
regulation at the federal level and speaks to the core mission of the 
FTC in its control over the information flow.107 The FTC Act 
declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”108 Although this sweeps broadly, this section 
vests the FTC with the power to compel the removal of certain 
materially-false bits of information from the marketplace and seek 
penalties for those who put the information into circulation.109 
Prohibiting advertisers from making false or misleading claims 
falls into this category.110 
Removing nakedly false data from the decision-making pool 
                                                          
106 In 1981, Richard Craswell described the FTC’s approach toward 
regulating disclosure measured against the FTC Act’s “unfairness” standard. 
[T]he failure to disclose information . . . will be [deemed] unfair if: (1) 
consumers currently lack the information in question; (2) consumers 
would choose differently if they had the information, thus facing sellers 
with a different set of demand curves; and (3) the benefits of better 
consumer decisions and improved seller performance are not 
outweighed by the costs of supplying the information. 
Craswell, supra note 12, at 123. Included in the third category are the costs of 
collecting and disseminating the additional information, and the risks that 
disclosure “might [somehow] mislead consumers even further.” Id. 
107 “A deceptive claim that constitutes a false statement ‘is clearly at the 
core of most people’s understanding of deception.’” Beales et al., supra note 46, 
at 496. 
108 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (a)(1) (West 2010).   
109 Though as Beales et al. note, this definition of deception proves too 
narrow as it ignores broader concerns about the effect of other “less patently 
deceptive” claims on consumer decision making. Beales et al., supra note 46, at 
495–96. 
110 See Craswell, supra note 12, at 123–27 (addressing “unsubstantiated 
advertising claims”). Sellers must have a reasonable basis for believing all 
claims they make at the time they make them. Id. at 123. 
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represents an almost pure form of debiasing through law. If 
advertising regulation and debiasing through law are closely 
related, this specific portion of the FTC’s mandate is the closest 
cousin. When the advertising practices are patently unfair, an 
economic rationale undergirds this basic form of consumer 
protection.111 
iii. Removing True Information 
Under the broad auspices of Section 5, “unfair” acts are 
unlawful. Conceivably, the disclosure of true information could be 
unfair, thus unlawful. Consumer endorsements might fall into this 
category, if offered in a way that leads consumers to misleading 
conclusions.112 
Certain norms direct suspicion at regulation that removes true 
information from the marketplace.113 First Amendment 
                                                          
111 Transactions induced by false claims “contribute nothing to consumer 
welfare.” Beales et al., supra note 46, at 496. Of interesting note is 15 U.S.C. § 
45(a), which enables with specificity regulation of “Made in the U.S.A.” 
labeling. This is a disclosure regulation that protects producers of products of 
United States origin from false claims of origin by foreign competitors. 
Consumers would probably not lose utility from use of a product with a falsely-
labeled origin if they did not know about it. 
112 Craswell, in his early framework, might have bucketed this problem, the 
consumer endorsement problem, within a category he deemed, “difficult . . . to 
analyze,” “unfair persuasive techniques.” Craswell, supra note 12, at 139–51. 
Specifically, Craswell notes that “one-sided advertising” had been deemed 
unfair because although the claims were true, they were so overwhelming that 
they washed over countervailing consumer knowledge. Consumers were not 
deceived by false information, they were unfairly persuaded.  The examples 
cited were FTC actions involving advertising about cigarettes and food products 
linked to child nutrition. Id. at 147–51. “True, but unfair,” could apply to 
consumer endorsements, but Craswell expresses difficulty in reconciling this 
bucket. Note that Craswell peers into the future with a plea to social science for 
some assistance in assessing the fairness of persuasion techniques. “It may 
eventually be possible to develop a rationale for these cases, by improving our 
understanding of consumer decision making and the psychological effects of 
advertising.” Id. at 150. 
113 Although, seller claims (or affirmative statements lacking a reasonable 
basis when made that are later even proven true) are vulnerable to be deemed 
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jurisprudence reflects that anti-paternalistic norm. As Justice 
Stevens noted in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,114 “[t]he First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that 
seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives 
to be their own good.”115 In 44 Liquormart, the Court struck down 
two Rhode Island statutes that removed true information from 
entering the marketplace. The Rhode Island laws prohibited 
advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages away from the 
point of sale.116 This price information was core offering 
information, not even persuasive “residue.” 
Nonetheless, the specific situation matters. Removing true 
information from the marketplace can assist consumers in certain 
decision-making environments. Of recent note, Professor Elizabeth 
Warren, in advocating for the establishment of a Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), argued for mandating 
simplification and streamlining of disclosures and forms so that 
consumers would have easier means for comparing financial 
products. This amounts to removing information to simplify the 
transactional environment. “Over-disclosure” can occasionally 
confuse and overwhelm consumers in an information-heavy 
environment.117  Warren wrote: 
The truth, of course, is that no consumer “chooses” to 
accept the tricks and traps buried within the legalese of 
financial products. Rather, consumers must choose among 
various products with one feature in common: dozens of 
pages of incomprehensible fine print. 
The CFPA will not limit consumer choice. Instead, it will 
focus on putting consumers in a position to make choices 
for themselves by streamlining regulations, making 
disclosures smarter, and making financial products easier to 
understand and compare. The Agency will promote plain 
vanilla contracts—short, easy to read mortgages and credit 
                                                          
“unfair.” Id. at 123. 
114 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
115 Id. at 503. 
116 Id. at 489–90. 
117 See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 103. 
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card agreements. The key principle behind the new agency 
is that disclosure that runs on for pages is not real 
disclosure—it’s just a way to hide more tricks. Real 
disclosure means that a lender has to be able to explain 
what it is selling so that the customer can read it and 
understand it. Once consumers can understand the risk and 
costs of various products—and can compare those products 
quickly and cheaply—the market will innovate around their 
preferences.118 
Warren’s proposal amounts to advocating the removal and 
resequencing of true information to enhance consumer decision 
making. The proposal presents another example of debiasing 
through law.119 
Of course, consumer-endorsement regulation could be 
classified as an effort to debias through law by removing true 
information from the market environment. Unlike the alcohol at 
issue in 44 Liquormart or the financial products at issue with the 
CFPA, however, consumer-endorsement regulation controls a 
tactic that cuts across all products and services. Across the board, 
the FTC has effectively deemed that consumer endorsements have 
the power to injure consumers, and that true narratives and 
testimony about a usage experience must be tightly monitored, if 
not in reality nudged out of the commercial-information sphere. 
From a policy standpoint, addressing the information problems 
offering-by-offering might have more appeal. Alcohol, mortgages, 
and sandwich shops all intersect with advertising differently and 
all present different types and degrees of transactional risk for the 
consumer. Why not factor in these differences when addressing the 
regulatory problem of consumer endorsements rather than firing 
what effectively amounts to a blanket salvo? 
                                                          
118 Elizabeth Warren, Three Myths About the Consumer Financial Product 
Agency, THE BASELINE SCENARIO (Jul. 19, 2010, 06:00 AM), http://baseline 
scenario.com/2009/07/21/three-myths-about-the-consumer-financial-product-
agency/. 
119 See also generally Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy 
Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008) (arguing that social detriments of 
promoting consumer financial literacy could exceed the benefits, implying that 
removing this information might be helpful to consumers). 
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Next, this Article hones in on these recent restrictions on 
consumer advertising embodied in the 2009 revised consumer-
endorsement guides. Examining this case study in detail should 
illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims embodied by 
advocates of the debiasing-through-law approach. Are regulators 
capable of this sort of precision welfare engineering?120 Can 
regulators preserve real choice while simultaneously improving 
decisions? Consumer-endorsement regulation provides an example 
of debiasing through law in action. 
II. A CASE STUDY FROM ADVERTISING REGULATION 
Consumer endorsements have a long history and heritage in 
advertising in the United States. The power of a real peer, a real 
product or service user, to induce a transaction has been 
acknowledged by marketers,121 regulators,122 and consumer 
activists.123 
Following the statutory mission, the FTC prophylactically 
seeks to eliminate and prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices 
and advertising, which it has power to regulate under Section 5 of 
                                                          
120 Within the definitional scheme of deceptive advertising regulation that 
Beales et al. describes, it is challenging, but possible to envision where the new 
consumer-endorsement regulation would slot in as a cure. Beales et al. largely 
focus on false claims, production of inaccurate consumer beliefs, and failures to 
disclose. See Beales et al., supra note 46, at 496–501. Most likely, they would 
see this regulation as addressing inaccurate consumer beliefs—and much of their 
discussion of the remedy for this focuses on improved disclosure. Beales et al. 
do not focus on the removal of true information as a remedy. As discussed infra, 
consumer endorsements have a complex impact on consumer decision making 
and social welfare. 
121 See, e.g., Letter from John Feldman & Anthony DiResta, Reed Smith 
LLP, on Behalf of Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, to Office of the Secretary, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2009); FTC File No.: P034520 (Mar. 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/endorsementguides2/539124-000 
06.pdf (reviewing the Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising). 
122 See HASTAK & MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3; HASTAK & MAZIS, 
DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 3 (demonstrating power of consumer 
endorsements to create audience recall of message). 
123 See, e.g., Greenberg Statement, supra note 2, at 14–20. 
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the FTC Act.124 Given that producers aggressively seek to induce 
transactions against the inertia of the closed human wallet,125 and 
then against competing offers of other producers, the advertising 
arena can be quite fierce tactically. 
Virtually all advertising promotes a call to consumer action. 
The call to action can be pure—a mere dissemination of 
information about price, qualities, and availability.126 Questions 
start to emerge when the call starts to employ devices that move 
beyond communicating the “pure” component of the call to 
action—into persuasion. Strategic bundling and pricing of an offer 
can cause the consumer to value the package differently if laid out 
one way versus another way. The medium of the message can 
convey information that does not directly relate to the product. A 
trusted celebrity endorser or a consumer endorser can add a layer 
of credibility and identity to the message.   
The question is whether adding these extra layers of persuasion 
to the plain message are unlawfully deceptive or instead a positive 
addition of useful content. For example, inducing the sale of a food 
processor by communicating that a free set of steak knives is 
included, instead of simply offering the processor and the knives 
together at the same price, may not yield incremental social 
welfare, but would most probably be lawful.127 Also, consider that 
a marketer can lawfully employ a trusted B-list actor to promote a 
                                                          
124 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2) (West 2010). 
125 See discussion of endowment effect, supra Part I. Though the 
conclusions and implications are now wrapped in some degree of controversy, 
Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated through classroom laboratory experiments 
that people value a loss of X greater than an absolute gain of X. See generally 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, 
Prospect Theory]. At the front end of a transaction, the implication is that 
inducing just an even exchange of value requires the marketer to overcome a 
level of cognitive impulse for the consumer not to part with what they already 
have. Kahneman and Tversky’s loss aversion work has further implications for 
analysis of consumer-endorsement regulation, specifically, in assessing the 
consumer’s reaction to the results of a transaction.  
126 The call to action can also be long-run—the creation of a brand image 
that communicates a message about the values behind a product. 
127 See 16 C.F.R. § 251.1 (2011). See generally Friedman, supra note 85. 
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safety-alert system for older people.128 Even if disclosed as a 
compensated endorser and not a user, the somewhat misplaced 
trust in the actor is designed to rub off onto the no-name alert 
system.129 The former case we may accept because it is practically 
difficult to control that form of bundling manipulation. The latter 
case could be troubling on the surface, but what if the offering is 
an honest one and the target audience needed the comfort of the 
celebrity endorsement to enter into a “good” transaction? 
The consumer endorsement takes advantage of many of the 
same biases as the rest of advertising. Advertisers count on tapping 
into an array of consumer biological and cognitive biases to induce 
transactions, and, in turn, mitigate the biases that inhibit them to 
act. As noted, the advertising arena, a petri dish for psychological 
and cognitive games, provides a natural testing ground for 
debiasing through law. In particular, consumer endorsements have 
been wide open for debiasing “treatment” and the FTC has, in fact, 
accorded them this treatment. Section A begins with a description 
of the power of consumer endorsements, using a well-known 
advertising campaign as a working example; Section B describes 
the change in regulatory approach and its potential impact in 
general terms; and finally, Section C analyzes the various biases 
that the new approach uses to effectively neutralize the power of 
consumer endorsements.  
A. The Power of Consumer Endorsements 
In 1998, morbidly-obese Indiana University college student 
Jared Fogle began a journey toward achieving iconic celebrity and 
cultural-touchstone status.130 Eating nothing but weight-loss 
                                                          
128 This genre and application of celebrity endorsement ad has become so 
common that actor Sam Waterston spoofed it on Saturday Night Live, pitching 
“robot insurance” (as a “compensated endorser”) to senior citizens to protect 
them from “robot attacks.” Saturday Night Live: Laura Leighton/Rancid (NBC 
television broadcast Nov. 18, 1995).  
129 See 16 C.F.R § 255.5 (2011). 
130 Bob Levey, Column, Q&A with Bob Levey, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 
2003), http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/03/r_metro_levey_031 
803.htm. Fogle has also been spoofed on Saturday Night Live and even in an 
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friendly Subway131 sandwiches, Fogle ultimately shed and kept off 
over two hundred pounds.132  Two years later, sharp-eyed regional 
Subway franchise owners received word of Fogle’s astonishing 
achievement and retained him to tell his story in their 
advertisements. Not long after the regional commercials 
demonstrated tremendous effectiveness, Subway’s corporate 
headquarters recruited “Jared,” as he would come to be known, for 
a national campaign.133 Over the next decade, “Jared” lured not 
just crash dieters, but all kinds of health-conscious consumers 
through Subway’s doors, helping to spur Subway’s location 
presence to equate that of McDonald’s, the ultimate food-industry 
franchising pioneer, by 2009.134 
Although a number of factors likely drove the astonishing 
growth of Subway since 2000, the “Jared” campaign, according to 
CEO Jeff Moody, provided the “absolute cornerstone” for 
“Subway’s success.”135 Moody opined: 
I believe the company would have been successful without 
Jared but not nearly to the degree that we are because he 
took these healthy products and gave them a face and said 
something that people could relate to. I mean he’s not a 
celebrity because he set out to be, he’s a celebrity [be]cause 
. . . he resonated with people that had similar issues to him 
and said, well if that guy can do it, I can do it . . . .136 
Moody effectively described the power of a peer 
recommendation or demonstration in the context of a commercial 
                                                          
episode of South Park. Blair Chancey, Subway’s Savior, QSR MAG. (Sept. 
2008), http://www.qsrmagazine.com/articles/features/119/subway-1.phtml. 
131 Subway, Inc. franchised 22,000 sandwich shops in the United States as 
of 2008. See Jared’s Revenge, supra note 1. 
132 Id. 
133 CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK 218–221 (2007). Heath 
and Heath offer additional compelling explanations for the Jared campaign’s 
enduring success. 
134 Emily Bryson York, Subway Set to Overtake McD’s in Omnipresence, 
ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 21, 2009, at 3, available at http://adage.com/Article? 
Article_id=139145. 
135 Jared’s Revenge, supra note 1. 
136 Id. 
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offer. Fogle, at least at the outset of his arrangement with Subway, 
would qualify as a “consumer endorser” by the FTC.137 Under the 
Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising that were in effect until 2009 (“Previous Guides”), 
Subway could use Fogle’s outlier endorsement, provided that the 
company disclaimed the endorser’s experience as an atypical 
result.138   
Due to the recent changes in the Guides, this highly-effective 
type of consumer endorsement campaign would be significantly 
more impractical to launch effectively now. Had Subway wished to 
launch a consumer-endorsement Jared-style campaign today, under 
the new guides (“Revised Guides”), the company would have had 
to choose between two regulatory compliance paths. Subway could 
either choose to disclose scientifically-derived, empirically-sound, 
“typical” results alongside Jared’s results, significantly cluttering 
the message or Subway could simultaneously broadcast an 
“atypicality” disclaimer, similar to the one previously required but 
without any accompanying safe-harbor protections. The FTC 
warns that in this new regime, the disclosure route should also be 
backed up by empirical evidence that the totality of the 
advertisement is non-deceptive.139 This looming threat of 
                                                          
137 Arguably, Jared Fogle has now achieved a level of fame that would also 
subject him to regulation as a celebrity endorser for Subway under 16 C.F.R § 
255.5 (2009). 
138 The disclaimer provided a safe harbor. As an alternative, under the 
Previous Guides, advertisers could present the expected results alongside the 
exceptional results presented by the consumer endorser.  
The Guides are administrative interpretations of the law intended to 
help advertisers comply with the Federal Trade Commission Act; they 
are not binding law themselves. In any law enforcement action 
challenging the allegedly deceptive use of testimonials or 
endorsements, the Commission would have the burden of proving that 
the challenged conduct violates the FTC Act.  
FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials, supra note 
1.  
139 See 16 C.F.R. § 255.2 (2009). The FTC warns advertisers to take 
significant precautions should they pursue the route of a typicality disclaimer: 
The Commission tested the communication of advertisements 
containing testimonials that clearly and prominently disclosed either 
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enforcement puts a heavy burden on the prospective use of this 
tactic. The FTC explicitly advises advertisers to maintain this 
evidence to avoid the risk of the initiation of an FTC action taken 
with respect to such an advertisement.140 
The Revised Guides aim to put a serious brake on the practice 
of using consumer endorsements, given evidence that consumers 
unduly raise their expectations about the salutary effects of a good 
or service after exposure to a peer’s true, but exceptional, 
experience with the offering.141 Consumer endorsements indeed 
would be costlier to employ after the revision, given the empirical 
compliance requirements, and from a regulatory standpoint, would 
certainly be riskier to use.  
At first glance this regulatory approach may seem like a 
simple, straightforward, common-sense adjustment to the flow of 
commercial information aimed at consumers. The FTC is charged 
with protecting consumers from “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices,”142 and clamping down on advertiser presentation of 
misleading material would certainly be within that authority. If 
presenting a consumer endorser’s true, but atypical, experience 
                                                          
“Results not typical” or the stronger “These testimonials are based on 
the experiences of a few people and you are not likely to have similar 
results.” Neither disclosure adequately reduced the communication that 
the experiences depicted are generally representative. Based upon this 
research, the Commission believes that similar disclaimers regarding 
the limited applicability of an endorser’s experience to what consumers 
may generally expect to achieve are unlikely to be effective. 
Nonetheless, the Commission cannot rule out the possibility that a 
strong disclaimer of typicality could be effective in the context of a 
particular advertisement. Although the Commission would have the 
burden of proof in a law enforcement action, the Commission notes that 
an advertiser possessing reliable empirical testing demonstrating that 
the net impression of its advertisement with such a disclaimer is non-
deceptive will avoid the risk of the initiation of such an action in the 
first instance. 
Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Like the consumers in the Hastak & Mazis studies. See HASTAK & 
MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3; HASTAK & MAZIS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENT, 
supra note 3. 
142 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (West 2010). 
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effectively misleads the public, regulators may choose to debias 
consumers by drastically restricting or altering the practice. 
Here, the FTC has taken a less-common tack in protecting 
consumers from receiving bits of information that are entirely true, 
but potentially so powerful in their truth that the dissemination of 
these bits need to be tightly-controlled.143 This “you can’t handle 
the truth”144 quirk in the regulatory approach opens the door to 
some serious questions, both in this instance and generally. 
Part of the overall question involves determining the nature of 
the entirety of the commercial offering and what the consumer 
endorsement intends to convey. In addition to selling healthy 
sandwiches, is Subway selling the hope to consumers (not the 
promise) that if they transact regularly with Subway they will lose 
significant amounts of weight? Is hope an appropriate product to 
sell? Or is Subway merely trying to induce consumer transactions 
through cognitive error, using a strange, but true, story as 
aspirational bait?   
Framed another way, if an internet dating service presents the 
testimonial of a married couple that met through use of its offering, 
is the dating service legitimately selling hope, attempting to induce 
transactions through cognitive error, or both? Another potential 
way of framing “hope” is to suggest that Subway and the dating 
service are selling an expected range of outcomes.145 Perhaps, 
presenting a product or service in a way that taps into that expected 
“range of outcomes” presents as an entirely different offering in 
                                                          
143 See generally Turner, supra note 105. Shielding truthful information to 
preserve a broader truthful narrative can be important in the jurisprudence of 
evidence, to purify jury decision making or protect other interests. See, e.g., 
FED. R. EVID. 407 (subsequent remedial measures); FED. R. EVID. 408 
(compromise and offers to compromise); FED. R. EVID. 409 (payment of medical 
and similar expenses); FED. R. EVID. 411 (liability insurance). In other contexts, 
people shield the vulnerable from truth when the truth has little value and great 
detriment. 
144 See A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992). 
145 The Commission employed professionals to write two reports to study 
the effects of consumer endorsements and disclosures. While the reports showed 
that consumers might expect the demonstrated results in an advertisement to be 
atypical, the reports did not probe about the range of expectations for a set of 
individual consumers. See HASTAK & MAZIS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra 
note 3; HASTAK & MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3. 
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the marketplace. Consumers may know that experiences vary and 
may want to be aware of the positive possibilities. They may weigh 
their expectations optimistically—but is it the feeling of optimism 
that they are buying? Are these transactions a milder form of a 
lottery ticket, where the above-average expectation of winning 
may drive the purchase in spite of disclosed odds, but the thrill of 
the range of expectations is part of the product?146 Or is it a less 
transparent lottery ticket? If Powerball advertised lottery tickets as 
short-term “Grade D-” bonds instead of presenting the visual 
narrative of an ordinary person receiving an oversized check, 
would the perceived ex-ante value of a lottery offering be 
diminished? One would almost have to argue that consumers are 
buying hope, not a certainty, even if consumer expectations might 
be prone to optimistic distortion. 
If the presentation of a wider range of possible outcomes from 
a transaction induces more transactions, some positive social 
welfare might be created, simply through exchange. Ex-ante hope, 
based on a truthful experience relayed by a peer consumer, might 
have innate welfare value, and ex post disappointment, though 
quite real, is something with which consumer transactions in 
general are rife. Regulators cannot fix all disappointments, 
however initially induced. A shift in regulatory policy that 
effectively quashes consumer endorsements may remove some 
distortions of expectation by smoothing out certain cognitive 
biases,147 but not at zero welfare cost. If this holds true, a brief 
assessment of the impact of the Revised Guides can illuminate the 
pitfalls of debiasing through law. 
B. The New Regulatory Approach and Potential Impact 
1. Previous Regulatory Approach 
Under the Previous Guides, advertisers could present the 
                                                          
146 Gambling on lottery tickets can be destructive after a point, but the 
common practice has been to showcase winning jackpot tickets, which might 
have longer odds than finding a spouse on a dating website. For a vibrant view 
into lottery psychology and sociology, see LUCKY (Big Beach Films 2010). 
147 See infra Part II.C. 
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experiences of consumer endorsers under limited conditions. The 
most basic requirement was that the consumer endorser, if 
represented directly or implicitly to be an actual consumer, must 
have been an actual consumer.148 Use of a consumer endorsement 
implies that the advertiser “represent[s] that the endorser’s 
experience is representative of what consumers will generally 
achieve with the advertised product in actual, albeit variable, 
conditions of use.”149 The Previous Guides required that 
advertisers possess substantiation that the advertised product’s 
result would perform at the level the consumer endorser enjoyed, 
or that “the advertisement . . . either clearly and conspicuously 
disclose[d] what the generally expected performance would be in 
the depicted circumstances.” The other option, commonly availed, 
is for the advertiser to “disclose the limited applicability of the 
endorser’s experience to what consumers may generally expect to 
achieve.”150 Quite often, this safe harbor would be employed by 
the advertiser simply slapping a disclaimer into the advertisement 
denoting something to the effect of, “Results not typical” or 
“Results may vary.” 
2. New Approach 
The Revised Guides make this safe-harbor option more 
impractical for advertisers. If advertisers use consumer endorsers, 
substantiation must be developed and possessed to support the 
typicality of the endorser’s experience, and if the endorser’s 
experience is atypical, the true typical experience must be 
disclosed. No longer can a marketer promote an endorser who had 
an outlier experience and cure it magically with a mild disclaimer.   
At first blush, the Revised Guides may appear to advance 
consumer welfare. No longer will consumers be deceived by 
outlier results. But as this Article discusses, consumers may not 
always be “tricked” by these results. Consumers may know that 
they are buying the chance to achieve the consumer endorser’s 
result. That is, consumers may be buying the “hope” that they can 
                                                          
148 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(b) (1980). 
149 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(a) (1980). 
150 Id. 
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achieve the result—and this purchase may be rational. Consumers 
do retain protection without the Revised Guides. If an ad is 
deceptive or unfair, the FTC already has the power to address it.151   
These recent changes effectively eliminate the consumer option 
to select hope as a product feature in this context. How does taking 
hope off the market advance consumer welfare? Does taking away 
a person’s hope that their acne might clear like a peer consumer’s 
did in the television ad advance consumer welfare? Does removing 
a lonely person’s hope that a dating service might bring them down 
the course toward marriage advance consumer welfare? Some 
consumer advocates imply that by showcasing a high-end result for 
consumers, this hope must almost always find its roots in and lead 
to deception.152  
This guidance change effectively puts an end to a long-
established practice that American consumers have become 
accustomed to seeing every day, and as a commercial cultural 
change alone, demands notice. Specifically, this could be the death 
of campaigns that use consumer endorsers to engage peers with 
optimism that use of a product or service might have an outlier 
outcome like that of a Jared Fogle.   
When advertisers communicate through consumer endorsers, 
they are trading on the aspirations of the target consumer to 
achieve that result. “If that person got thin, toned their abdominal 
muscles, cleared up their skin, found a life partner and was able 
make $100,000 per year working from home, or simply get rich, 
why can’t I?”153 One might interpret the implicit dialogue between 
advertiser and consumer that way. Or it might be a mere 
conveyance of information that this is an achievable (but not 
certain) result from use of the product or service—and that with an 
associated disclaimer, a consumer should internalize that this true 
information presented to them presents a possible but not 
necessarily a probable result. Other scenarios may appear more 
benign. For example, consumer endorsers can be employed by 
local restaurants, owners of bed-and-breakfasts, and businesses 
                                                          
151 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010). 
152 See Greenberg Statement, supra note 2.   
153 Human appearance, mating, and money all seem to present ripe 
opportunities for the use of a consumer endorsement. 
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with lower accessibility to a brand. The consumer endorser can 
provide information to other consumers about the feel of the user 
experience. 
One common thread woven through all of these consumer-
endorsement scenarios is that they involve a marketer attempting 
to transmit information about a product through the experiences of 
an actual user. This information at its most pure and benign 
conveys a true experience and facilitates a transaction to happen 
with proper expectations on the part of the consumer. At its most 
nefarious, advertisers can use this approach to seize a true 
consumer experience and use it to create unrealistic expectations 
that induce a “bad,” welfare-destroying consumer transaction.   
C. Benefits of the New Approach: Neutralizing Cognitive 
Biases  
The Revised Guides should effectively eliminate the ability of 
marketers to exploit a number of cognitive biases to effectuate 
transactions. Part C explores some of the major biases that 
consumer endorsements play on and that the Revised Guides 
address. For consumers, generally, this represents a positive 
development standing alone, but as this Article explores in Part III, 
a downside must also be weighed. 
1. Optimism Bias and Hope 
Where hope is commoditized, cognitive psychology must be 
nearby. Where commerce meets cognitive psychology, behavioral 
law and economics cannot be avoided. These “Jared-style” 
consumer-endorsement campaigns exploit the power of a few 
widely accepted psychological phenomena absorbed by the 
behavioral law and economics literature, notably optimism bias 
and the availability heuristic. Optimism bias, famously epitomized 
by humorist Garrison Keillor as the “Lake Wobegon” syndrome,154 
                                                          
154 As broadcaster Garrison Keillor famously repeats about his blessed, 
fictional upper midwestern town, “Lake Wobegon, where all the women are 
strong, all the men are good-looking and all the children are above average.” 10 
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refers to the inclination of individuals to believe that there is an 
above-average chance of good things happening to them and a 
below-average chance of bad things. The optimism bias drives 
people to get out of bed in the morning and encourages risk-
taking.155 One study demonstrated that half of consumers believed 
that their own households carried “below average” risk, with the 
other half believing that their households were average. Basic 
arithmetic tells us that result reflects undue optimism in sum.156   
[P]eople typically think that their chances of a range of bad 
outcomes, from having an auto accident to contracting a 
particular disease to getting fired from a job, are 
significantly lower than the average person’s chances of 
suffering these misfortunes—although, again, this cannot 
be true for everyone.157 
                                                          
Questions for Garrison Keillor, TIME (Dec. 21, 2009), available at http://www. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1946961,00.html (emphasis added). 
155 For an overview of the optimism bias, see David A. Armor & Shelley E. 
Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334–47 
(Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). This cognitive 
bias can be credited for getting businesses off the ground, despite high rates of 
start-up failure. See generally Arnold C. Cooper, William C. Dunkelberg & 
Carolyn Y. Woo, Entrepreneurs Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 97 (1988). 
156 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 204; WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP 
VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 93–95 (1992). 
157 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 204. See also Christine Jolls, 
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1653, 1659 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis]. This 
phenomenon transcends personal judgments and translates even into 
professional judgments. Another recent study concluded that litigators are prone 
to routinely overestimate the success of the outcomes of their cases before the 
fact. See generally Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders Granhag, Maria 
Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to 
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010). Goodman-
Delahunty et al. even employed a debiasing technique, exposure of the subject to 
what Jolls and Sunstein deemed “truthful narratives of harm,” to alter the 
thought process, as opposed to cold exposure to statistics, or overly-aggressive 
tactics that turn off reception. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 215. 
Goodman-Delahunty et al. asked some of their lawyer subjects “to generate 
reasons why they might not achieve their stated goals. This manipulation did not 
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Much of this view of the optimism bias can be framed as a 
relative one. Individuals measure their risk against that of other 
individuals. Some literature shows that individuals are overly 
optimistic (or not as pessimistic as they should be) in assessment 
of stand-alone event probabilities.158 Jolls and Sunstein summarize 
numerous studies: 
reporting that professional financial experts consistently 
overestimate likely corporate earnings, while business 
school students overestimate their likely starting salary and 
the number of [job] offers they will receive.159 People also 
underestimate their own likelihood of being involved in an 
automobile accident, and their frequent failure to buy 
insurance for floods and earthquakes is consistent with the 
view that people are excessively optimistic.160 
The frame of the optimism bias tells us that consumers may be 
cognitively wired to view the stated experience and outcome of 
another consumer as one they can readily attain—even if that 
stated experience is at the upper boundary of what one could hope 
to realize from the advertised product or service.161 
Optimism bias can be applied to this problem in two different 
ways—first, there are some aspirations induced by advertisers that 
are not necessarily detrimental to consumers. Consumers need to 
have some level of optimism about the results of a transaction in 
order for the transaction to be induced. If the information is not 
unfair or deceptive, this transaction should yield welfare. 
Communication of the attainability of a result might be the primary 
purpose for advertising. Fogle transmitted the message that 
                                                          
improve calibration [with the real outcomes.]” Goodman-Delahunty et al., 
supra, at 133. 
158 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 204. 
159 Id. at 205; Armor & Taylor, supra note 155, at 334–35.  
160 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 205; Jolls, Behavioral Economics 
Analysis, supra note 157, at 1660–61. 
161 A brain-imaging study may have shed some light on why this might be. 
When considering the potential negative outcomes from a decision, the brain 
may not retain the memory of negative past events as well as it does positive 
events. See generally Tali Sharot, Alison M. Riccardi, Candace M. Raio & 
Elizabeth A. Phelps, Neural Mechanisms Mediating Optimism Bias, 450 
NATURE 102 (Nov. 1, 2007). 
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consumption of the Subway offering could lead to significant 
weight loss. According to Subway’s management, this message 
induced millions of additional consumer transactions, presumably 
creating welfare. 
The second application of the optimism bias, which the FTC is 
at least implicitly concerned about, is the dangerous type of 
consumer endorsement claim that deliberately induces systemic 
cognitive errors. The FTC aspires to eliminate advertisements that 
yield so much unjustified optimism that they deceive the public 
and result in bad transactions that are ultimately damaging to 
welfare. If hope, or a range of outcomes, is on the market, welfare-
seeking regulators should not want undue optimism to cause 
people to overvalue systematically the probability that they will 
receive the higher range of the outcome. 
Even though this more nefarious use of the optimism bias 
likely yields cognitive errors that result in consumer 
disappointment, the absolute magnitude of the disappointment of 
the result after the fact compared with expectations before the fact 
is not well-understood.162  
If the optimism bias implies that the hard-wired hope of above-
average results will be routinely dashed as results regress to the 
mean, it becomes more important to consider hope—and lost hope. 
The ancient Greeks held hope out as a sacred value. After Pandora 
“unleashed the affliction, disease and death upon mankind”163 from 
her box, only one thing remained, hope. The import of hope, and 
the concept that hope would be a cruel thing to dash, has deep 
roots. The ancients knew that hope had a special value as a 
force.164 
Moving to the modern problem of false hope in the commercial 
context, there is a notion that true information can lead to false 
hope. Disappointment per se can be socially costly, which means 
that fostering a high level of hope, or hope for a higher-than-
                                                          
162 The FTC-commissioned studies fail to provide this analysis. 
163 ANNA POTAMIANOU, HOPE: A SHIELD IN THE ECONOMY OF BORDERLINE 
STATES 6 (1997). 
164 For a brief discussion of hope and social trust, see GEORGE 
CVETKOVICH & TIMOTHY C. EARLE, SOCIAL TRUST: TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN 
SOCIETY 69–75 (1995). 
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typical result, can be destructive. If a weight-loss company induces 
purchase of its program through hope for a certain result, and this 
result is not obtained, this may lead to lost consumer emotional 
investment in hope, as well as the more transparent lost financial 
investment. More than the financial investment would be lost; hope 
would be lost, too. This can put the consumer in a position where 
the utility loss exceeds what would normally be expected from 
squandered value. Kahneman and Tversky famously found that 
people are cognitively predisposed to assign a heavier value to a 
loss of X than to the value of a gain of X.165 Manufacturing and 
selling hope of an above-typical result and failing to deliver can 
diminish utility more dramatically than in a transaction where the 
typical result would be expected. 
But again, it is important to note that traditional FTC discretion 
would be valuable in regulating the sale of hope via consumer 
endorsements. Certainly, the hope dashed from failing to achieve 
an above-typical result from an expensive weight-loss company 
program differs from that of the hope dashed from the Subway 
program, which consists of a series of continuing, non-obliging 
transactions. Yet, consumer endorsements for both are deterred by 
the new regulations.166 Why would we regulate hope the same way 
for two very different cases? Subway operates, interacts, markets, 
and transacts with consumers in a vastly different manner than 
weight-loss programs. The transactions are serial and smaller, and 
the program is simple. Weight-loss programs tend to require a 
longer contractual commitment and a deeper financial 
investment.167 The damage levels from the potential betrayal of 
hope from a Subway program are likely below that of a typical 
weight-loss program. 
If hope is valuable, taking a sweeping approach to forbid firms 
from creating it and marketing it as an attribute of their product or 
                                                          
165 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 125. 
166 Subway may be less deterred than a small weight-loss company if it has 
more resources to defend the advertising in an action. 
167 The websites of two of the leading weight-loss companies at 
www.jennycraig.com and www.weightwatchers.com illustrate the programmatic 
and extended nature of required consumer commitment in that industry. JENNY 
CRAIG, www.jennycraig.com (last visited Aug. 13, 2010); WEIGHT WATCHERS, 
www.weightwatchers.com (last visited Aug. 13, 2010). 
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service should have a downside somewhere. Basic cognitive 
science behind the optimism bias and consumer human valuation 
of gains and losses can inform our understanding of the trade-offs 
of a sweeping change. Assessing the impact of taking hope off the 
market in this wholesale manner can lead us to a clearer picture of 
the regulatory impact. 
2. Availability Bias 
Working along with the optimism bias, and perhaps even a 
subject of greater concern about consumer endorsements, is the 
availability bias.168 Put simply, people tend to use the information 
most readily available to them as a heuristic for what the broader 
picture looks like. Consumers are deluged with data of all types in 
the marketplace and must find efficient shortcuts to navigate 
through them. 
Behavioralists often present the availability bias through the 
example of people overestimating risk and taking disproportionate 
steps to mitigate or avoid such risk.169 Fear of domestic terrorism 
may provide one example of overestimation of risk, as the media 
coverage after a tragedy on the scale of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, made terrorism risk more “available” to the 
public.170 Sunbathing may present a more serious risk to public 
health, but the information is not nearly as dramatically and 
graphically available.171 The public has more access to information 
about homicide through the media and less access to information 
about suicides, which leads to a commonly-held, but incorrect 
conclusion that homicide is more prevalent than suicide.172 That 
conclusion could foster the formation of misguided public-health 
attitudes. 
                                                          
168 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Availability: A 
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 
(1973); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
169 See SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, supra note 7, at 24–26. 
170 Id. at 25. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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Also undergirding the availability bias is “salience,”173 which 
strongly relates to consumer-endorsement regulation. A salient 
experience will prove much more available when assessing the 
probability that an event or result will occur. For example, directly 
experiencing an earthquake will cause a person to have a more 
accessible data point when assessing the risks of experiencing a 
future earthquake.174 “Vivid and easily imagined” risks like dying 
in a plane crash are over-weighted in comparison to other risks like 
death by asphyxiation from choking on food.175 The consumer 
endorsement is employed to make a positive outcome both the 
most accessible piece of information and the most vivid one. 
If presented with a strong consumer endorsement, the 
availability bias predicts that the consumer will heed that 
information because the advertiser has centered it right in front of 
them. The question still remains whether they will discount the 
more spectacular claims made by consumer endorsers as a possible 
result, rather than a probable result (on a spectrum of results). 
Much of this depends on the total pool of information that is 
available and competing with the consumer’s attention in a given 
environment. 
Where consumer endorsements are the centerpiece of an 
advertisement, they become the available focus of the consumer. 
The Revised Guides remove consumer endorsements from that 
centerpiece, potentially neutralizing errors attributable to the 
availability bias. 
3. Framing Effect 
Prospect theory, promoted by Kahneman and Tversky,176 
contends that humans evaluate the impact of decisions based on 
“an initial reference point, rather than on the basis of the nature of 
the outcome itself.”177 Tied closely into prospect theory is the 
                                                          
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory, 
supra note 125. 
177 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 205. 
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endowment effect and loss aversion. These theories and 
observations reinforce the notion that people value losses heavier 
than gains.178 
From a practical perspective, the related “framing effect” 
demonstrates that perceptions and decision processes can be 
manipulated by framing certain outcomes as losses and others as 
gains.179 Advertisers and policymakers put the framing effect to 
work constantly. 
Jolls and Sunstein identified a fairly recent controversy that 
emerged in the public-health arena involving framing and the use 
of advertising to promote behavioral changes.180 Breastfeeding 
advocates tangled with the baby formula industry over a public-
service advertising campaign that graphically emphasized the risks 
of choosing not to breastfeed.181 The risks presented in the 
campaign included a higher incidence of leukemia and childhood 
asthma.182 One ad supported by the activists presented images of 
pregnant women roller-skating with a voiceover: “You’d never 
take risks while you’re pregnant. Why start when the baby is 
born?”183 Representatives from the baby-formula industry 
blanched at this tactic and urged that the campaign present a 
message that emphasized the positive benefits of breastfeeding, 
rather than a parade of potentially terrible consequences.184 Indeed, 
the breastfeeding advocates were trying to emphasize downside 
risks (losses), which people tend to value more highly, while the 
baby formula industry, in pushing for a softer touch, wished to 
emphasis the benefits, which people tend to value lower.185 The 
                                                          
178 This path of thinking, constructed around bounded rationality, creates 
outcomes that are different from what one would anticipate from traditional 
expected utility theory. Id. 
179 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of 
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).  
180 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 206. 
181 Melody Petersen, Breastfeeding Ads Delayed by a Dispute over 
Content, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/04/ 
business/media-business-advertising-breastfeeding-ads-delayed-dispute-over-
content.html?scp=1&sq=%22breastfeeding%20ads%20delayed%22&st=cse.  
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 206. 
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two interest groups were sparring over the framing of the 
consequences of the decision to breastfeed. 
With the Revised Guides, the FTC has implicitly recognized 
that “truthful narratives” are quite powerful in this consumer 
endorsement context as well.186 Truthful narratives, like the one 
deployed by the breast-feeding advocates, perform a debiasing 
function, a non-intrusive means of guiding choices, but debiasing 
advocates generally think of these narratives as a positive 
interventional tool.187 With consumer endorsements, a different 
view of the “truthful narrative” is presented—one where the 
truthful narrative could be harmful to the consumer. In fact, this 
view even offers a few commissioned studies to attempt to prove 
the harm.188 
The truthful narrative in this instance communicates a 
remarkable story to consumers about the results that one of their 
peers has achieved from using a product or service. Jared Fogle 
told the world his story. His narrative (Subway’s narrative) was 
about how an obese but otherwise ordinary young man from 
Indiana achieved weight loss (in what appears to be a less painful 
way than conventional dieting) with the disciplined consumption 
of savory Subway products. 
From a debiasing perspective, removing information from the 
marketplace and specifically, information packaged in this 
narrative form, demonstrates the power of a narrative in the 
negative. The narrative produces the framing in a vivid way, and 
the new regulation silences that narrative and erases the outlier 
reference point. 
With the Revised Guides, at least in the first round of the game, 
no choices have been paternalistically removed from the 
consumer’s menu. All that has been removed is a tactic that 
regulators purport misleads consumers into making cognitive 
errors, engaging in “bad” transactions by latching on to compelling 
narratives. As this Article will explore further in Part III, a broad 
                                                          
186 Id. at 215. 
187 See generally Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6; SUNSTEIN & THALER, 
NUDGE, supra note 7. 
188 See HASTAK & MAZIS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 3; HASTAK 
& MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3. 
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stroke such as this one that removes this information might 
constitute “overshooting,”189 to use the parlance of Jolls and 
Sunstein. Removal of consumer endorsements might prevent 
“good,” social-welfare-accreting transactions from occurring. 
Additionally, the consumption of some goods and services yields 
value through the actual risk of the consumption experience per se. 
There might be something valuable to knowing that a dating 
service merely could lead to a match ending in marriage, for 
example. Risk is purchased everywhere. Consumers have ranges of 
expected outcomes for their experiences and quite often they are 
purchasing this range. 
The broad-stroke regulatory deterrence of consumer 
endorsements might at best have an ambiguous impact. Framing is 
a tool that marketers may use to induce transactions, and certainly 
consumer endorsements pin the consumer around the reference 
point of the endorser. It does not logically follow and there is no 
available proof, however,190 that in the aggregate, framing tactics 
by advertisers in this manner reduces social welfare. Debiasing this 
particular effect is of unproven social value and unknown social 
risk. 
4. Representativeness Bias 
Representativeness bias presents another cognitive quirk that 
the Revised Guides would seem to neutralize.191 People have great 
difficulty comprehending that certain events that may seem to 
occur in a cluster are actually occurring randomly.192 Classic 
examples of this are studies of the misperception of “hot hands” in 
                                                          
189 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 230–31. 
190 The Hastak and Mazis studies were narrowly limited to three offerings, 
weight-loss programs, dietary supplements, and money-making opportunities. 
HASTAK & MAZIS, WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 3; HASTAK & MAZIS, DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 3. 
191 See generally Shane Frederick & Daniel Kahneman, Representativeness 
Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgement, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
192 See SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, supra note 7, at 27. 
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basketball free throws,193 the misperception of precision targeting 
of bombings during air-raid campaigns,194 and from epidemiology, 
the misperception of the formation of local cancer clusters.195 The 
human brain subconsciously makes sense of a random sample 
through a larger extrapolation that is part of a greater scheme. 
Much of stereotyping is the product of this phenomenon. 
If consumer endorsers present the real, but exceptional, results 
that they have enjoyed with an offering, the recipients of the 
message may be prone to the distortions of the representativeness 
bias. The real, but outlier, results may be the genuine product of 
randomness. Presented alone, consumers may extrapolate from 
them the conclusion that they are more typical of the set of 
experiences that people will have with the offering. By chilling 
consumer endorsements, the Revised Guides make it difficult for 
advertisers to highlight the outliers, which may neutralize this bias 
from working in this circumstance. 
5. Confirmation Bias 
The confirmation bias describes the natural tendency of people 
to seek and to accept information that confirms previous 
perceptions and to eschew other information. 
If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic 
aspect of human reasoning that deserves attention above all 
others, the confirmation bias would have to be among the 
candidates for consideration. Many have written about this 
bias, and it appears to be sufficiently strong and pervasive 
that one is led to wonder whether the bias, by itself, might 
                                                          
193 See generally Thomas Gilovich, Amos Tversky & Robert Villone, The 
Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences, 17 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 295 (1985); Caryn Conley & Jay Koehler, The “Hot 
Hand” Myth in Professional Basketball, 25 J. SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 253 
(2003). 
194 THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY 
OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 19 (1991). 
195 SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, supra note 7, at 31. See also Cancer 
Clusters: CDC Activities: Fact Sheet, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/clusters/factsheet.htm (last visited July 
30, 2010). 
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account for a significant fraction of the disputes, 
altercations, and misunderstandings that occur among 
individuals, groups, and nations.196 
Wishful thinking pervades human decision making, and hope 
springs as eternal in the consumer transactional context as it does 
anywhere else. Cognitively, humans are predisposed to seek 
information that confirms or reinforces preconceived notions about 
their worldview.197 
Consumers seeking a desirable result may grasp on to that 
result as the likely outcome from a certain course of action, simply 
because it might confirm a belief that there is a cheap, easy means 
to achieving a result. If a person wishes to lose weight, and an 
advertiser presents him with a narrative about an easy system for 
losing weight, along with an extremely positive actual outcome, 
confirmation bias should influence the person. The information 
that confirms the result that the weight-loss seeker wishes to be 
true will be accorded more heft. 
Put differently, people have demonstrated that they will 
maintain a high evidentiary standard for acceptance of ideas or 
conclusions that they have a predisposition to dislike and a lower 
standard of proof for ideas or conclusions that they prefer. The 
revised approach toward consumer endorsements removes from 
the information sphere one of the many tools that advertisers can 
use to trigger the confirmation bias. Simply showing through a 
consumer endorsement that an offering might solve a problem or 
meet a need can induce a transaction—if the consumer falls prone 
to seeking confirmation that there is a way to solve a certain 
problem or meet a certain need. 
Generally, debiasing through law, or in this case, through 
advertising regulation, can disarm a host of potentially distortive 
cognitive triggers, including but not limited to the ones mentioned 
here. However benign the regulatory intention, some negative 
spillover effects can result from this disarming, which this Article 
addresses in Part III. Any drag on the flow of information can 
change how players act in the marketplace. With consumer 
                                                          
196 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: An Ubiquitous Phenomenon 
in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). 
197 See generally id. (exploring in detail the entirety of confirmation bias). 
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endorsements, a seemingly well-intended policy change may 
present some other side effects. These side effects may well be 
tolerable, just like a medication’s side effects. But just as with 
medication, awareness of these side effects is necessary for 
evaluating whether the prescription is appropriate. 
III. POTENTIAL COSTS AND FAILURES OF THE NEW 
APPROACH 
As noted, the removal of true information from the marketplace 
provides an illustration of how debiasing can lead to unanticipated 
results, and hints that debiasing techniques should be targeted 
narrowly and cautiously. Having noted the salutary effects of the 
consumer-endorsement debiasing effort, this section will explore 
three primary areas of concern, all of which have a common 
thread. 
First, consumer endorsements effectively remove the 
presentation of “hope” in the marketplace and some offerings are 
hope. Removing “hope” or any offering from the marketplace runs 
the risk of reducing social welfare and removing choice from the 
marketplace. Closely related, the hard paternalism that debiasing 
through law tries to avoid rears its head if the elimination of 
consumer choice proves to be the practical result. 
When the commercial information flow is chilled, particularly 
the flow of true information, welfare-creating, Pareto-efficient 
transactions that may have occurred, might fail to occur. Forcing 
an offering entirely out of the marketplace can create such a loss, 
but so can consumer uncertainty caused by a restricted flow of 
data. The cost of transactions lost in this manner must be 
considered. 
Another potential effect that may result from the restriction of 
information in the market may be higher prices and deadweight 
loss. Although the impact from chilling consumer endorsements is 
uncertain, other restrictions in consumer markets, like a ban on 
disclosing price of alcoholic beverages away from the point of 
sale, have resulted in higher consumer prices and market 
disruption. Debiasing through law, toying with the information 
flow, and trying to improve consumer decision-making processes 
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can have secondary impacts of this sort. Again, this should guide 
the policymaker toward more cautious approaches when deploying 
debiasing strategies. “Nudging” requires a soft touch. 
Finally, debiasing is not well equipped to address several 
related normative problems. Defining “good” decision making and 
defining “good” social outcomes will be matters for policy debate 
that transcend the debiasing through law toolkit. Nonetheless, to 
create policy, paternalistic judgments must be made about what is 
“good.” 
With consumer endorsements, a view must be formed about the 
presentation and promotion of risk. Risk is naturally associated 
with a downside or potential losses. But risk can also embody 
something positive. As noted earlier, one person’s risk is another 
person’s hope, aspiration, or thrill. Policymakers still must make a 
potentially paternalistic judgment call on this dimension. 
A. Removing “Hope” from the Market 
The tighter regulation of consumer endorsements may remove 
a set of hope-based offerings from the market. The core offering 
may remain on the market, but without the consumer endorsement 
attached, the “hope” component of the offering may need to be 
eliminated. With a new, looming threat of civil enforcement, the 
costs and risks of using the consumer-endorsement marketing 
tactic make the approach riskier and costlier for an advertiser to 
deploy. This can destroy welfare if the underlying potential 
transaction would create welfare. 
An illustration distills this point. Consider the example of a 
dating service. A dating service may use consumer endorsements 
to emphasize the number of successful matches the service has 
facilitated—and perhaps even the number of marriages that it has 
enabled. This could be effectively done through the presentation of 
a beautiful (or accessible) newlywed couple describing the 
narrative of how the site enabled their marital bliss. 
This sort of presentation would deliver to the consumer a 
compelling narrative about the uppermost boundary of the range of 
outcomes sought by someone using this service to find a life 
partner. The range of results comprises this offering—ranging 
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from mere entertainment from browsing the site to an ultimate goal 
(finding a date or mate). Part of the offering might be the 
excitement about having access to this range of outcomes. 
Promoting the boundaries highlights this excitement and promotes 
hope. Hope is part of this product. If regulation removes hope from 
the market, the market transaction for that hope obviously cannot 
occur. Less “hope” will be produced and consumed, and less 
welfare accordingly created. 
All offerings present a range of expected outcomes from 
consumption or use of the offering. Some ranges are tighter than 
others. An offering comprised of a can of a strongly-branded 
popular beverage would present a very tight range of expected 
outcome for consumers. A new four-star restaurant might present a 
much broader range of expected outcomes—and this might be part 
of the draw for potential consumers. The thrill of the risk of trying 
something novel and the hope that it will surpass expectations 
might be part of the restaurant experience. With a chain restaurant, 
consumers are not purchasing the thrill of a broad range, they are 
purchasing a comparatively narrow range of outcome. Consumers 
seek more certainty rather than hopes or thrills in this instance. 
If an offering in this circumstance was entirely centered on 
hope, and depended heavily on consumer endorsements to promote 
that hope, the entirety of the offering may disappear. This might be 
a positive social development, if the promoted offering is of 
dubious value, like a “make-money-from-home” system that offers 
outlier testimonials. If the offering retains value and transactions 
can yield social welfare, the effective elimination of the offering 
would prove socially costly. A conceivable example might lie in an 
effective weight-loss program that can only sell at scale through the 
use of consumer-endorsement marketing tactics. 
Taking hope “off the market”—with hope embedded in part of 
an offering or the entirety of an offering—will eliminate some 
welfare-producing transactions. Chilling the practice of describing 
hope through the narrative of a consumer endorsement can lead to 
that result. Broadly debiasing through law can similarly yield to 
results of concern. Addressing this particular problem in a more 
targeted way may prove more socially valuable, though the 
regulatory enforcement effort may be more complex and 
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challenging. This type of regulatory brain surgery must be 
performed with care because the consequences can prove 
unpredictable. 
The consumer-endorsement restrictions also put downward 
pressure on social welfare simply by removing information from 
the marketplace. As the next section explains, when true 
information is removed from the marketplace, uncertainty looms, 
parties are less likely to transact, and transactions fail. 
B. The Cost of Failed Transactions  
Any regulatory intervention that removes true information 
from the marketplace should anticipate that the market will put a 
damper on the communications that enable transactions to happen. 
Debiasing through law may seem more nuanced, but tampering 
with information in a broad way to improve consumer decision 
making may have repercussions in the marketplace. 
In the basic advertising scenario, banning deceptive or 
misleading information from the marketplace should prevent 
resource misallocation. Before an advertisement-influenced 
transaction, consumers would be willing to transact and part with 
something of value for something else to which they assign greater 
subjective value.198 If an advertisement conveys misleading or 
false information or makes misrepresentations, this false 
conveyance tampers with the consumer’s pre-transaction 
subjective valuation. If the transaction happens, the consumer will 
receive less than what was expected. This leads to a resource 
                                                          
198 Adam Smith wrote: 
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: 
Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is 
the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain 
from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we 
stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to 
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of 
their advantages.  
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 18 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) 
(1904). 
FRIEDMAN - FINAL2.DOC 5/17/2011  12:45 PM 
 Debiasing Advertising 601 
misallocation, deadweight loss, diminished social welfare, and 
unjust outcomes. 
A regime with no regulation of advertising, that of pure caveat 
emptor or lax enforcement of current laws and regulations, would 
prove economically chaotic. Transactions costs would rise, as 
consumers would need to perform more due diligence on those 
with whom they transact.199 Brand identity and professional 
licensing would matter more—even more than they do currently—
in markets as consumers would seek heuristics for counterparty 
trustworthiness.200 In an environment of increased uncertainty 
about the validity of claims, one would expect consumers to 
change their purchase equation. Consumers would not be willing to 
pay as much for an offering made with uncertain representations. 
The uncertain representations would translate into a lower 
expected subjective value by the consumer for the offering.   
Generally, the transactions costs would rise because of the 
consumer uncertainty—and because of the extra information 
gathering required to build trust in the offering. The current system 
of policing advertising aims to reduce these transactions costs by 
purifying information. The FTC, the states, other advertising 
regulators like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
private enforcement mechanisms201 work together toward this 
goal—reducing social costs by addressing dishonesty. 
George Akerlof’s renowned article, The Market for 
                                                          
199 Permitting claims to float in the market without the confidence of a 
degree of substantiation would prove socially expensive. “[T]he concern with 
unsubstantiated claims is that they force consumers to bear the risk . . . .  
Consumers must either verify the claim themselves—which will be prohibitively 
expensive—or else purchase the product without knowing whether the 
unsubstantiated claim is reliable or not.” Craswell, supra note 12, at 123. 
200 Akerlof, supra note 80, at 499–500. For a brief discussion of the role of 
brand, see Beales et al., supra note 46, at 502. 
201 E.g., through civil remedies afforded by the Lanham Act, Section 
43(a)(1)(B). Softer private-enforcement mechanisms also include industry self-
regulation and codes, though these mechanisms have limited public benefit. See 
generally Herbert J. Rotfeld, Power and Limitation of Media Clearance 
Practices and Advertising Self-Regulation, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 87 
(1992). See also generally Jean J. Boddewyn, Advertising Self-Regulation: True 
Purpose and Limits, 18 J. ADVERTISING 19 (1989). 
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“Lemons,”202 presented a “structure . . . for determining the 
economic costs of dishonesty.”203 Akerlof held out the individual 
used car market204 as an example of a market where transactions 
fail due to perceived information asymmetry. Sellers have the best 
information about the true value of their own used cars. The sellers 
know more about the true condition, history, and performance of 
their own vehicles. Buyers do not have access to that information 
and therefore will discount the price that they will be willing to pay 
for the used car, because they do not have complete trust in sellers. 
Sellers expect the “true” value for the car, but buyers, in their 
uncertainty, won’t pay that value. Often, this gap yields a 
transactional failure, as the parties cannot reach agreement on 
price.205 
Given that wealth and utility are created when parties 
successfully exchange goods, this “lemon” phenomenon points 
toward a common scenario where an information gap obstructs 
welfare from being created. When applied to advertising 
regulation, Akerlof’s findings have multiple implications. 
Eradicating deception from advertising leads to economic 
certainty, efficiency, and just results. Goods and services are 
exchanged at their stated qualities and subjective expectations from 
the exchange are met. Further, confidence and trust in the system 
at large is restored, furthering an environment hospitable for 
exchange. 
However, as would be the case with most regulatory activity, 
overzealous or overbroad rulemaking and enforcement in combat 
                                                          
202 See Akerlof, supra note 80, at 488 (examining the costs incurred as a 
result of mistrust and information asymmetry). 
203 Id. at 488. 
204 Long before entities like CarFax emerged to bridge the information gap 
in this industry by detailing the title records of all automobiles. See CARFAX, 
www.carfax.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2010). For a brief history of CarFax, see 
Lisa Wade McCormick, CARFAX History, CONSUMER AFFAIRS.COM (Oct. 10, 
2006), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/10/carfax_history.html. 
205 See Akerlof, supra note 80, at 204 (exemplifying the model by utilizing 
automobiles as an example). Note also that certified, pre-owned auto dealer 
offerings and third-party warranties have emerged to bridge or effectively 
discount the trust gap. See Certified Pre-Owned Vehicles Programs, 
EDMUNDS.COM, http://www.edmunds.com/certified-cars/certified-pre-owned-
vehicle-programs.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
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of deceptive advertising would potentially produce deleterious 
effects just as economically damaging as under-enforcement. 
When providers of products and services are compelled to disclose 
less information—or banned from disclosing true information—
because of the risk that they may run afoul of new and aggressive 
regulation, consumer uncertainty about the nature of the offering 
rises. When consumers know less about an offering, they may be 
less likely to transact. Consumers would adjust downward the 
value that they are willing to exchange for the offering. Producers 
would supply less as a result of a diminished expected return. 
Deadweight loss would increase.   
The chilling of information exchange reduces the ability of the 
buying and selling parties to communicate at a distance about the 
offering, thereby reducing the potential for exchange. If the 
information is truly false and deceives, the exchange should not 
take place. However, the risk of punishment for stepping over the 
line may prevent advertisers from treading anywhere near the 
acceptable line to ensure compliance. Larger, established entities 
may preserve their competitive position at the expense of smaller 
entities in this environment. Those with established reputations 
should prevail under the notion of trust.206 Even though debiasing 
through law may appear to be relatively unobtrusive and oriented 
toward improving individual decision making, in this particular 
instance the secondary effects may hit the market more broadly, 
leaving the welfare impact open to question. Removing true 
information can remove a true avenue of valuable commercial 
communication. 
C. Unintended Consequences: Price Effects 
Debiasing through law, advertising regulation, and specifically, 
the removal of true information from the marketplace, can have an 
upside in correcting consumer biases. Potential downsides lurk, 
                                                          
206 Note how entities tend to disclose when they were established as a 
means of presenting durability and trustworthiness. For instance, the author’s 
law school’s website advertises that the institution was established in 1883. 
COLLEGE OF LAW – WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/ 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
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however, with debiasing, just as they would with traditional 
paternalistic regulation that directly eliminates consumer choices.  
Here, this Article briefly discusses the subtle price distortions 
that could result from the implementation of the Revised Guides. 
Enhanced regulation of advertising could simply lead to less 
advertising because of the increased cost of advertising per se. If 
consumer endorsements are the preferred route to marketing an 
offering, eliminating that tactic will force the advertiser to use a 
second-best approach. This second-best approach will likely be 
less effective, all things being equal, and therefore, more 
expensive. If all marketers had to play by the same rules, 
consumers may bear some of this burden. Generally, “if . . . 
[increased] advertising regulation also succeeded in reducing the 
extent of advertising by raising the cost of advertising, firms in 
many industries might have an incentive to seek such regulation 
because it would result in less competition and higher retail 
prices.”207 The resulting decrease in social welfare and increase in 
deadweight loss could provide yet another example of an 
unanticipated secondary effect from debiasing. 
Further, economists have observed in several studies that “the 
prices of goods and services in places that restrict advertising tend 
to be higher than those in places that do not restrict advertising.”208 
These linkage studies between advertising and pricing have ranged 
across consumer goods, from eyeglasses and drugs to alcohol.209 
Restrictions on information in the marketplace “often tend to 
inhibit competition, with consequent efficiency losses.”210 
Though it may be difficult to predict what will happen to retail 
                                                          
207 Zeynep K. Hansen & Marc T. Law, The Political Economy of Truth-in-
Advertising Regulation During the Progressive Era, 51 J.L. & ECON. 251, 256 
(2008). 
208 Id. at 255. 
209 See, e.g., id.; Jeffrey Milyo & Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Advertising 
on Prices: Evidence in the Wake of 44 Liquormart, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1081 
(1999); John E. Kwoka, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric 
Services, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 211 (1984); Lee K. Benham, The Effect of 
Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337 (1972); John F. 
Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects of Restrictions on Drug Price 
Advertising, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 493 (1976). 
210 Beales et al., supra note 46, at 514. 
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pricing in the industries heavily affected by the Revised Guides, an 
empirical trail heightens suspicion that the restriction of 
information may yield unanticipated changes. The new consumer-
endorsement approach does not restrict display of prices but it does 
effectively restrict a major form of information from reaching the 
marketplace. Debiasing may seem non-intrusive and “soft” but the 
impact can be unpredictable and not always positive for social 
welfare. 
D. The Stubborn Normative Question 
Advocates of debiasing through law claim the approach to be 
comparatively unintrusive to traditional regulation, less 
paternalistic, and protective of ultimate consumer choice. To have 
meaning, these expressed values must be colored by the real goals 
of any debiasing effort, which by and large, appear to be about 
minimizing risk or tightening the range of expected transactional 
outcomes. Generalizing this approach across the broad range of 
commercial transactions can be normatively challenging—the risks 
involved with different types of transactions are situationally 
unique. 
Is it always correct to minimize risk through disclosure or 
restriction of information? As noted, somewhere in every 
consumer transaction, hope itself is for sale. In routine 
transactions, the result rarely diverges from the expected range. In 
some transactions (tickets to a new Broadway mystery musical, for 
example), the range of expected results might be part of the sought 
experience. Minimizing risk and closing the range of expectations 
through a mandatory disclosure about the mystery ending of the 
mystery musical may prove socially destructive, though it would in 
some sense protect consumers from seeing something unwanted.  
As modern American political strategists are deftly aware, if 
“hope” can be credibly attached to a political purchase, voters 
might just buy it.211 Do voters expect that all of their hopes will 
                                                          
211 Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas closed his 1992 Democratic 
Presidential Nomination speech by declaring (in a wrap-around reference to his 
birthplace of Hope, Arkansas) that he “still believe[d] in a place called Hope.” 
Bill Clinton, Governor, Acceptance Speech to the Democratic National 
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truly be realized? Lotteries market themselves this way.212 In the 
gambling and lottery instances, rational consumers would know 
that “the house” will win, on average, but they are often buying the 
thrill. 
Sometimes consumers contract for hope and are willing to 
accept a certain amount of disappointment. They are expecting to 
purchase a set of probabilities. This applies to staying at unfamiliar 
hotels, buying a new lawnmower, or buying an article of clothing. 
Consumers may know that goods and services are not perfect but 
the information that it worked for someone like them gives them 
the hope to try it. What is normatively wrong with offering that 
range of expectations? Advocates of debiasing still must wrestle 
with the questions that old-fashioned regulators must answer—
namely, which risks are acceptable to expose to consumers and 
which are not? Debiasing addresses this question by intervening in 
the decision-making process and paternalistic regulation addresses 
this question by directly removing the risky choices from the 
marketplace. 
This is not to say that regulators should surrender in their 
efforts to match appropriate venues and approaches for managing 
consumer risk. Consumers demonstrate emotional discomfort with 
the risks associated with certain transactions, particularly high-
stakes transactions. This can diminish the willingness to 
transact.213 As noted through the implications of Akerlof’s work, 
and in the discussion of social welfare, promoting Pareto-superior 
transactions should be a policy goal. Policymakers need to sort 
through these risk-involved scenarios on a granular level but must 
be careful not to develop a sweeping view that seeks to mitigate all 
risk—because not all risks are the same. 
                                                          
Convention (Jul. 16, 1992) (transcript available at http://www.4president.org/ 
speeches/billclinton1992acceptance.htm). 
212 See, e.g., MEGA MILLIONS, http://www.megamillions.com (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2010) (promoting the lottery with a “Your Dream Here” theme). 
213 Daniel McFadden, Free Markets and Fettered Consumers, AEA 
Presidential Address (Jan. 7, 2006), at 4–6 (transcript available at http://elsa. 
berkeley.edu/~mcfadden/aea/presidentialaddress.pdf). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATION TO POLICYMAKERS 
Policymakers must be selective and careful when they 
intervene and engage in debiasing through law. Advertising 
provides the perfect backdrop for assessment of debiasing 
techniques. 
The new approach to consumer-endorsement regulation, as put 
forth in the Revised Guides, provides an enlightening case study. A 
sweeping approach toward concealing true information about 
consumer experiences could have a different impact across 
different consumer markets. Consumer-endorsement regulation, 
though controlling a narrow information tactic, could be tightened 
to address certain industries more carefully. 
Industry-targeted regulation of information presentation might 
be most sharply demonstrated with the pharmaceuticals markets. 
For example, the FDA accorded special attention to direct-to-
consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals, as spending on this form 
of advertising in this market grew from $12 million in 1989 to 
$2.38 billion in 2001.214 A broad array of guidelines and rules were 
adopted prior to and during this period, specific to direct-to-
consumer pharmaceuticals advertising because of the unique risks 
presented by the products in this marketplace.215 The products are 
complex, confusing, and present large consequences resulting from 
the user experience. Information about the products may be 
entering from a variety of authoritative avenues, like physicians 
and pharmacists. This is a market where we would want risk to be 
minimized by enabling people to use the products in an informed 
manner. Finding clear answers proves difficult. But comparatively, 
pharmaceuticals may prove to be an area more worthy of debiasing 
attention than the sandwiches Jared Fogle promoted for Subway. 
Consumer-endorsement regulation shows us that some 
industries require more attention than others and that 
overregulation of consumer endorsements in certain industries can 
                                                          
214 C. Daniel Mullins & Francis B. Palumbo, The Development of Direct-
to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 
423, 423 (2002). 
215 See generally id. 
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be welfare-destroying.216 This provides a lesson more broadly for 
regulators who intend to use the new tools highlighted in the 
popular book, Nudge,217 and who intend to apply the concepts of 
debiasing. Selectively deploying debiasing strategies proves key.218 
This type of informational intervention should be performed with 
caution and elegance, given the intersections between the 
uncertainties of markets and human behavior. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Debiasing through law can be a powerful and creative 
approach toward regulation and increasing consumer welfare, but 
application requires care. The revised FTC approach to consumer-
endorsement regulation provides a cautionary tale about a 
seemingly benign regulation that may ultimately prove to sweep 
too broadly.219 If regulators had attempted to pursue specific 
industries or markets, rather than chilling an entire tactic, total 
welfare—and consumer welfare—could potentially have been 
further enhanced. 
Debiasing approximates much of the law of advertising 
regulation, as Jolls and Sunstein note. The regulation, as reflected 
in the Revised Guides, illustrates an approach where debiasing 
could have been effected more artfully, either through an industry 
or product-oriented approach. Though the FTC seemed to be 
                                                          
216 Treating consumer endorsements monolithically ignores the notion that 
some consumer endorsements may be more deceptive than others. Craswell “has 
suggested that the laws against deceptive advertising could best be understood 
as applying a form of cost-benefit analysis to the interpretation of 
advertisements.” Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 549, 550 (1985). Craswell 
advocates applying a case-specific approach toward advertising regulation, 
inquiring into the “total injury” that an advertisement might cause, and whether 
the advertiser could have taken affirmative steps to prevent the injury. Craswell 
describes his approach as similar to the “Learned Hand test.” See generally id. 
217 SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, supra note 7. 
218 Fortunately, the FTC has retained enforcement discretion, but 
unfortunately, the warning shot from the Revised Guides was broadcast without 
discrimination. 
219 The Revised Guides are still very new. This Article can only speculate 
about the future potential impact with the tools available. 
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aiming to eliminate or heavily burden a tactic, in an effort to 
improve consumer decision making, it effectively may have taken 
products off the market by “overshooting.” Consumer welfare in 
this instance could have been maximized with a more careful 
approach, one driven by typical cases, not the worst cases like the 
weight-loss industry.  
This Article can draw several conclusions from the revised 
consumer-endorsement regulation that can be applied more 
generally to the underlying principles of debiasing through law. 
The revised consumer-endorsement regulations will likely increase 
the cost of inducing transactions in the arenas where this 
advertising is most commonly used, reducing welfare in some 
markets. In industries or markets that require a bit more protection 
for the consumer, like pharmaceuticals, the restriction of true 
information provided by real consumers about their experience 
might be welfare-enhancing. If laid down broadly, regulations such 
as these could have a mixed impact on social welfare, depending 
on how the regulation affects the variety of transactions that lead 
consumers to expect a range of results.   
The key lesson for policymakers from the consumer 
endorsements example is that great care should be taken when 
tampering with the market information flow. Debiasing through 
law focuses on using information to enhance decision-making, 
which can certainly happen. But the potential downsides and side-
effects are as real as the downsides of traditional, paternalistic 
regulation, and should not be discounted. 
